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INTRODUCTION

I am legally free to reveal embarrassing information about
you. Generally speaking, I am also free to negotiate payment to
refrain from exercising a legal right. But if I combine the two-offering to remain silent for a fee-I am guilty of a felony: blackmail. Why?
The so-called paradox of blackmail' has garnered an extraordinary degree of interdisciplinary scholarly attention. Contribu1 Although the reason why the addition of a conditional threat should make a legal
difference is obscure, this puzzle is not, as a matter of strict logic, a paradox. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Truth and Consequences:The Force ofBlackmail's Central Case, 141 U Pa L Rev
1741, 1742-43 (1993). Nonetheless, following convention, we need not insist upon the
point.
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tors to the debate have included law professors and judges, moral
philosophers and economists. Despite many efforts, however, it is
an understatement to observe that no consensus has emerged in
support of any one or combination of the proffered theories.2 Indeed, in his afterword to a symposium devoted to the subject a
few years ago, Professor James Lindgren, the most intensely
committed contributor to the debate, ventured that the blackmail
paradox remains "one of the most elusive intellectual puzzles in
all of law."'
This Article proposes a new solution to the puzzle. Specifically, it endeavors both to justify blackmail's criminalization as
fully consistent with the central tenets of the criminal law and to
explain why, and under what circumstances, blackmail is properly criminalized.
The Article begins, in Section I, by arguing that no current
theory adequately unravels the paradox. Each fails to account for
significant and substantial aspects of prevailing blackmail law as
well as widespread intuitions about what the law should be. Furthermore, Section I seeks to demonstrate that the two predominant approaches to resolving the paradox (in addition to the specific answers thus far proposed) are doomed to failure. Consequentialist theories, which turn upon the particular social consequences of blackmail, and deontological theories, which seek to
identify the objective moral difference between the conditional
threat to perform an act and the unconditional performance of
that same act, will both always prove unable to distinguish
blackmail from much behavior that is, and should remain, free
from criminal sanction.
Section H develops and defends what I call the evidentiary
theory of blackmail. It begins with the proposition that, consistent with consequentialist as well as retributivist conceptions of
the justifying aim of the criminal law, society may criminalize
conduct that tends both to cause harm and to be undertaken with
wrongful motives. On this animating supposition, and because
society could (and often does) recognize injury to reputation as le2 The fullest elaboration of the puzzle, including critiques of initial efforts to solve it,
appears in James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 Colum L Rev 670
(1984). Other especially noteworthy contributions to the literature include Douglas H.
Ginsburg and Paul Shechtman, Blackmail:An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U Pa L
Rev 1849 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U
Pa L Rev 1817 (1993); Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 240-58 (Oxford 1988); Richard
A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U Chi L Rev 553 (1983); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A
PreliminaryInquiry, 63 Monist 156 (1980); and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia
84-87 (Basic Books 1974).
' James Lindgren, Blackmail:An Afterword, 141 U Pa L Rev 1975, 1975 (1993).
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gally cognizable harm, a legislature could unproblematically4
criminalize all disclosures of embarrassing information so
long as
we could reasonably believe that most persons who make such
disclosures do so with morally unacceptable motives. But the opposite is true: we know that people reveal embarrassing information about others for all types of reasons and, consequently, out of
varying moral postures-good, bad, and (arguably) neutral. The
diversity of motives for revealing hurtful information about others thus provides a sufficient (if not necessary) explanation for
society's refusal to proscribe and punish all such revelations. To
be sure, the legislature could try to tailor the offense so as to
punish only those persons who disclose embarrassing information
with, in Blackstone's term, "vitious will."5 But in that event the
factfinder would confront a hefty challenge: how to determine
whether any given defendant acted with the requisite bad motive.
If the defendant were a blackmailer, the task would be much
easier. For reasons to be explained, we can usually infer that an
individual who discloses embarrassing information only after the
person embarrassed by the disclosure fails to pay a requested
sum is driven by morally bad motivation to make that disclosure.
The act of blackmail thus has evidentiary significance only: it reveals something about the moral character of the actor's motivation that we would be less likely to suspect had he disclosed without first having made the conditional threat. Armed with that
(supposed) knowledge, society can punish the blackmailer for the
same reason that is sufficient to punish those who engage in unparadoxical, garden variety crimes: because the actor causes (or
threatens) harm while acting with morally culpable motives.
Section IH simultaneously tests and elaborates the evidentiary theory by analyzing a range of variations within and beyond
blackmail's paradigmatic case. This Section justifies criminalizing several types of blackmail that intuition (and, often, existing
law) suggests should be criminal, but that one or more prominent
theories have been unable to account for. It also explains why
several other classes of conduct that share the formal structure of
core cases of blackmail should not be criminal. In so doing, this
Section invites lawmakers to consider whether it would be feasible to exclude such conduct from the blackmail ban.6
" UnproblematicaUy, that is, as far as criminal theory is concerned. I here put aside
considerations strictly exogenous to the criminal law.
William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries*21.
6 This is not to demand a perfect identity between the positive law and the moral import of the evidentiary theory. Law is always somewhat over- and/or underinclusive relative to the dictates of its theoretical justifications. See generally Joseph Story, 1 Commen-
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Section IV suggests some broader lessons of the evidentiary
theory. After all, the blackmail paradox is not merely a tantalizing intellectual puzzle. The number and stature of minds it has
attracted bespeak a widely held belief that a solution to this single conundrum will bear broad and deep implications. As Lindgren has put it, simply if dramatically: "The struggle to understand blackmail is a struggle for the soul of the criminal law."'
This Section offers some thoughts regarding what significance the
evidentiary solution to the blackmail puzzle might have for the
fundamental questions of criminal theory. Also, in an effort both
to buttress the validity of the evidentiary theory in its core application and to demonstrate its utility outside the context of blackmail, I indicate how the analysis developed in Sections II and III
might help to resolve yet another of the great mysteries of the
law-the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
I.

EXISTING THEORIES: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE

The blackmail paradox has attracted an impressive array of
thinkers from a wide range of disciplines. For purposes of exposition and analysis (and following Lindgren), this Section divides
their theories into two broad groups.' Section I-A examines several theories that justify criminali.ation of blackmail by reference
to the supposedly adverse social consequences that could be expected in a regime that tolerated blackmail. Section I.B investigates theories that advocate criminalization on the grounds that
blackmail is wrong in and of itself.
Any satisfactory theory must account for both parts of the
blackmail puzzle. First, it must explain whether and why blackmail should be made criminal. Second, if it supports criminalization of blackmail, it must explain whether and why unconditional
performance of the acts a blackmailer might threaten should remain lawful. Put otherwise, the theory should provide an account
of the blackmail threat that both justifies its criminalization9 and
taries on Equity Jurisprudence § 7 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1877); Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules 31-34 (Oxford 1991).
Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1975 (cited in note 3).
S See Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 680 (cited in note 2). This is not quite to label the
first category "consequentialists" and the second "deontologists." See, for example, Gordon,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1741.46 (cited in note 1) (applying these labels to the two categories).
One who believes that blackmail is wrong on deontological grounds could approve its
criminalizationon consequentialist grounds. In other words, it can be important to distinguish the moral bases of claims about the wrongfulness of given conduct from the moral
bases of justifications for punishing that conduct. See notes 138-39 and accompanying
text.
' Few theories dispute that at least some substantial subset of the present offense of
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distinguishes it, in a manner relevant to that justification, from
the act upon which the threat is leveraged. By and large, the
theories in the first group passably perform the second task of
distinguishing the threat from the act. But they fail to accomplish
the first task-showing why blackmail should be criminal. In contrast, several theories in the second group provide seemingly persuasive explanations for blackmails criminalization, but fail to
account adequately for the difference between the threat and the
act. No prior theory performs both jobs satisfactorily.' °
A. The Social Consequences of Blackmail
This Section considers theories that justify blackmail's
criminalization on the grounds that decriminalization would produce undesirable social consequences.
1.

Law and Economics: criminalizing inefficient conduct.

The principal puzzle of blackmail is this: why is it (and
should it be) illegal to threaten to do what it is legal to do absent
a threat?" In other words, blackmail is an exception to the general rule of law and morals that one may threaten to exercise
one's rights. However, blackmail is also unusual in another respect. Ex post, the successful blackmail transaction looks like a
garden variety voluntary exchange: the blackmail "victim" buys

blackmail is properly made criminal. The contested questions, then, concern the reason for
its criminalization and the proper contours of the crime. One exception comes from libertarianism. See Murray N. Rothbard, 1 Man, Economy, and State 157 n 49 (Van Nostrand
1962) ("[Bllackmail would not be illegal in the free society. For blackmail is the receipt of
money in exchange for the service of not publicizing certain information about the other
person. No violence or threat of violence to person or property is involved."). Because
Rothbard's conclusion stands or falls upon familiar libertarian premises, however, it need
not be addressed here.
" This is not to say that a theory is necessarily infirm unless its lessons precisely conform to either present law or common moral intuitions. Rather, the theory must be able to
explain outcomes we would deem proper upon considered reflection. For a discussion of
this method of "reflective equilibrium," see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48-51
(Belknap 1971). Naturally, the "burden of persuasion" will fall most heavily on those theories that depart from the status quo by arguing either that blackmail (or some substantial
subset thereof) should be made legal, or that the unconditional performance of some presently legal acts should be made criminal.
" See, for example, Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second
Paradox, 141 U Pa L Rev 1663, 1663 (1993) ("The criminalization of blackmail has been
considered paradoxical because it would make unlawful a threat to do something the
threatener has a legal right to do."); Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1850,
1873 (cited in note 2); Gordon, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1742 (cited in note 1); Ronald H. Coase,
The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va L Rev 655, 667 (1988); Feinberg, Harmless
Wrongdoing at 252 (cited in note 2); Glanville L. Williams, Blackmail, 1954 Crim L Rev
79, 162-63.
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the blackmailer's promise not to disclose certain information to
which the blackmailer is privy. And, ex ante, the blackmailer's
threat to disclose the information unless the deal is consummated
looks just like any seller's threat to withhold a good or service
unless the potential buyer meets the seller's price. But voluntary
transactions are generally favored in the law. A second puzzle of
blackmail, then, is this: Why is blackmail, in contrast to other
voluntary transactions, illegal? 2
Because economists are great believers in voluntary transactions, this second puzzle has attracted some of the most distinguished minds in the field of law and economics. Almost all" favor continuing to criminalize blackmail-at least in its paradigmatic case-even while acknowledging that it is a voluntary
transaction. Unlike most other voluntary transactions, they argue, blackmail is economically inefficient. This Section presents
this economic thesis and then offers three reasons why it is infirm.
a) The argument: blackmailproduces deadweight loss. The central insight, associated principally with Judge Douglas Ginsburg
and Professor Ronald Coase, is simple: In an ordinary market
transaction, goods, services and/or money move in different directions. A gives $x to B, and B transfers good y to A. Because the
parties would not consummate the deal unless each valued her
expected end state higher than her initial state, the transaction
must make both parties better off. And, all things being equal, it
increases net social welfare. In contrast, the objective and the
usual result of a blackmail proposal is to redistribute economic
resources from the victim, A, to the blackmailer, B, without oth12

One answer to this puzzle would deny the premise. Under a theory traced to the

philosopher Robert Nozick, the blackmail proposal is coercive and, therefore, the consummated blackmail transaction is not a 'voluntary" exchange. If the exchange is not volun-

tary because the blackmailer coerces the victim (and assuming that coercion is a prima facie wrong), the coercion theory belongs to the second category-those that justify criminalization of blackmail as a wrong in itself. See Section I.B.4. In any event, although adherents of the law and economics approach by and large approve of criminalizing blackmail, few if any agree that the deal between blackmailer and victim is "involuntary." See,
for example, Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1819 (cited in note 2) ("One alternative to economic analysis in ... the blackmail cases is to play with the meaning of 'voluntary,' for
example by confining 'voluntary' acts to those in which severe constraints are absent; but

this just adds a layer of uncertainty."); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as PrivateJustice, 141 U Pa L Rev 1935, 1950 n 32 (1993) ("That the blackmailee may be faced with a
hard choice between the consequences of disclosure and paying the blackmailer does not
necessarily make the blackmail any more coercive than the choice facing many parties to

wholly legitimate economic transactions.").
" For one exception, see Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail FromA to C, 141 U Pa L Rev

1905 (1993) (discussed at notes 48-52 and accompanying text).
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erwise changing the status quo ante; B gives nothing of value toA.
The blackmail transaction is thus a sterile redistributive exchange. Crucially, moreover, it is not a costless one, for the practice consumes two types of resources. The blackmailer invests resources into "digging up the dirt," and both he and his victim incur transaction costs. Blackmail therefore is likely to be inefficient, producing deadweight losses and reducing overall social
utility. Hence, Ginsburg, Coase, and others conclude, it should be
prohibited.14
b) Adventitious blackmail: underinclusiveness. The first problem with the economic thesis is that it is based on a dubious, if
not manifestly incorrect, premise. Were blackmail legal and
blackmail contracts enforceable, B would be transferring something of value to A-B's right to perform the act he threatens. Before the transaction is completed, B is legally free to reveal A's
adultery to A's spouse. By accepting B's blackmail proposal and
tendering payment, however, A buys B's promise of silence (along,
very likely, with such tangible things as photographs and negatives).15 If both B and A exchange something of value, then the
existence of transaction costs (including resources B invests to
procure something valuable to offer A) seems irrelevant. The economic thesis does not distinguish blackmail from any other economic exchange. Put otherwise, "something does happen in a
blackmail bargain: a refraining of property rights between A and

B. "16
For the economic thesis to make sense, then, this "something" just cannot count. However, it is not immediately obvious
precisely why not. 7 For Ginsburg and Professor Paul Schechtman, the reason is that the above criticism misconceives the
proper time of comparison. The key, they argue, is to "view the
transaction at its outset," when B first contemplates blackmail
and has yet to unearth dirt on A: "No rational economic planner
" See, for example, Coase, 74 Va L Rev at 673 (cited in note 11); Ginsburg and
Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1865 (cited in note 2).
"SIt would be begging the question to object that B's promise is of no value on the
grounds that blackmail is illegal and blackmail contracts are unenforceable. Whether

blackmail should be illegal is precisely the question.
"Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1920 (cited in note 13).
'7 The reason for not counting it cannot be derived from the supposition that B has no
intent to do as he threatens. If the victim has confidence that the blackmailer will not
carry out his threat then, as a practical matter, the promise might well be valueless. In
that event, however, the victim will call the blackmailer's bluff. If, instead, the victim does
consummate a deal with the blackmailer, it can only be because he was not confident that
the blackmailer's threat was a bluff, in which case the latter's (legally enforceable) prom-

ise not to carry out his threat has value.
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would tolerate the existence of an industry dedicated to digging
up dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it." 8 In other
words, blackmail appears "nonallocative" if we compare the situation after the blackmail to that before the blackmailer began to
ferret for embarrassing information.
But this response hits an intractable difficulty. If the economic thesis must focus on the blackmailer's project before he acquires the potentially damaging information, it cannot justify
banning blackmail based on information that he happened upon
adventitiously. Professor Mike Hepworth has distinguished four
types of blackmail based on the manner in which the damaging
information is obtained: in "opportunistic blackmail," the blackmailer innocently stumbles upon information he subsequently realizes will serve as useful blackmail fodder; in "participant
blackmail," he was a participant in the conduct about which he
later blackmails the victim; in "commercial research blackmail,"
the blackmailer consciously seeks information in order to blackmail his victim; and in "entrepreneurial blackmail," the blackmailer entices a victim into a compromising situation for the specific purpose of producing the material with which he can blackmail. 9 Relying on this vocabulary, Lindgren objected years ago
(in response to Ginsburg's then unpublished manuscript) that the
economic approach is substantially underinclusive because it
cannot justify prohibition of either participant or opportunistic
blackmail 2 -- ikely a large percentage of all blackmail.
Note that Lindgren's objection is not that the potential magnitude of the deadweight loss is significantly smaller in cases of
participant and opportunistic blackmail than Ginsburg and
Shechtman suppose. It is true that in commercial research and
entrepreneurial blackmail, the deadweight loss is measured by
the sum of (1) the resources expended to discover the information
and (2) the transaction costs, whereas in opportunistic and participant blackmail, transaction costs constitute the entire deadweight loss. Properly understood, though, Lindgren's criticism is
far more profound. When the blackmailer does not make an independent effort to dig up information-that is, when the status
quo ante cannot be identified as any point prior to when he communicates the blackmail proposal to his victim-then there is no
basis for characterizing the completed transaction as nonallocative. The transaction costs, whatever they may be, are facilitaIS

Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1860 (cited in note 2).
Hepworth, Blackmail:Publicity and Secrecy in Everyday Life 73-77 (Routledge

19 Mike

1975).
Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 694-95 (cited in note 2).
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five, not deadweight-and mirror transaction costs present in ordinary bargaining situations.21
Instead of agreeing that their theory cannot explain the
crminalization of participant and opportunistic blackmail, Ginsburg and Shechtman argue that the transaction costs still justify
prohibiting blackmail even when the information the blackmailer
threatens to disclose is adventitiously obtained. In direct response to Lindgren, they claim that
it is of no moment that a particular B may have come by
compromising information accidentally. Should A refuse to
pay him, B has no reason to begin incurring expenses, such
as are necessary to secure publication of the information, except insofar as he is looking to future opportunities for
blackmail. The resources he expends in order to publish the
information (and presumably to get credit as the source of it)
are justified only from his ex ante perspective on the next
blackmailing opportunity-regardless of whether B sets out
to find it or waits for it again to come knocking at his door.
Thus, assuming that the first blackmail opportunity arrives
by accident, when B asks for payment to suppress what he
knows, he has become an entrepreneur of blackmail; for B
then to carry out his threat to reveal the information is an
investment decision, not a part of the earlier accident.'
This response does not withstand scrutiny. First, and least
significantly, insofar as it assumes substantial costs to the
blackmailer, the truth is more likely that "[t]he direct cost to a
21

As Pigou observed, bargaining itself imposes social costs. See A.C. Pigou, The Eco-

nomics of Welfare 200-03 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932). But because there is no more efficient
way of allocating goods and services than by private bargaining, it is hard to know what to
do with his observation. There is no way to eliminate bargaining, and the deception that
comes with it, without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. See Coase, 74 Va L Rev
at 671-73 (cited in note 11) (criticizing Pigou). Notably, when it comes to proposing a specific definition of blackmail, Ginsburg and Shechtman appear to overlook the fact that
bargaining even in ordinary commercial settings inherently "involves bluff, threats, and,
to some degree, deception." Id at 672. Blackmail, in their view, is a threat to perform a
lawful act that would confer no material benefit on the party making the threat. Ginsburg
and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1865 (cited in note 2). A momenfs reflection reveals
that this articulation is overbroad, for it encompasses every "threat" to hold out for a better deal in circumstances where the "threatener's" next best option is inferior to the offer
on the table. (For example, it would make an athlete's threat to sit out the season a criminal offense. Would the consequence be that teams could sign most of their draft choices for
something close to the minimum wage?) In short, no matter what might be said of their
theory, Ginsburg's and Shechtman's definition plainly does not accomplish the task they
set for themselves-namely, to distinguish blackmail from the ordinary bargaining that is
"actually relied upon in a competitive exchange economy to discipline the market." Id at
1849.
Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1875-76 (cited in note 2).
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blackmailer of actually carrying out his threat is ordinarily trivial; it takes almost no effort to mail a photograph or a document
to someone.' Second, the claim that B has no reason to incur expenses other than to bolster his reputation as a blackmailer is
dubious. IfA rejects B's proposal, B might carry out his threat out
of spite. And as Ginsburg and Shechtman themselves acknowledge, there is "no reason in economic theory to dishonor [B's]
preference for making A suffer."'
Most significantly (and this is a sufficient objection, even if B
incurs nontrivial costs to carry out his threat and even if he does
so solely in order to strengthen his reputation as a credible
threatener), Ginsburg and Schectman are wrong to conclude that
"It]he resources [B] expends.., are justified only from his ex ante
perspective on the next blackmailing opportunity.' Rather, any
expenses incurred might well be justified by the blackmailer's anticipation of the next bargainingopportunity. That Ginsburg and
Shechtman overlook this basic point is starkly illustrated by their
earlier argument that "B's only potential gain... is in establishing his credibility as someone willing to incur a cost if not obliged.
But that is an asset only insofar as B is an entrepreneur of
blackmail, i.e., someone who expects to engage in similar future
transactions." Not at all. A reputation as someone willing to
forego a benefit or incur costs if not obliged is extraordinarily
valuable in the "legitimate" business world. It allows one to secure a disproportionately large share of the potential benefits of
exchange. And, when it comes to exploiting that reputation, it
should make no difference whether it was forged as an adventitious blackmailer, or as a used car salesman, or as a distributor of
fava beans.
It remains to consider one other rejoinder to Lindgren's critique of the law and economic theory-a rejoinder that does not
Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail,
Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U Pa L Rev 1877, 1889 (1993). Shavell also notes that "[tihe
cost to a blackmailer of carrying out his threat probably inheres mainly in any resulting
increase in the risk of his being caught and punished. But the blackmailer can usually reveal his information anonymously, using the mail or the telephone.' Id. Shavell's point is
even stronger than he seems to realize. The blackmailer's costs of avoiding detection and
punishment are not relevant when deciding whether blackmail should be punishable.
Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1864 (cited in note 2) (emphasis
added). They proceed to argue, however, that the rational economic planner can ignore B's
welfare interest in acting spitefully on the grounds that "some potential gains are not realizable because they are not as great as the cost entailed in their identification.' Id. But if
B's pleasure in harming A counts in the welfare calculus, then a realistic appraisal of the
costs incurred by the adventitious blackmailer becomes critical.
Id at 1876 (emphasis altered).
Id at 1865 (emphasis added).
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rely on transaction costs. Professor Steven Shavell has agreed
that the criminality of participant and opportunistic blackmail
"cannot be explained by a need to discourage wasteful efforts to
obtain information." 7 Instead, he argues that if adventitious
blackmail is not illegal, "potential victims will exercise excessive
precautions or reduce their level of innocent, yet embarrassing,
activities" to prevent being blackmailed by persons who chance
upon damaging information."
This argument, however, will not work. Assume that, were
participant and opportunistic blackmail legalized, people would
reduce the level of activities that might serve as a basis for
blackmail, and would increase precautions against being discovered when they do engage in such activities. Such an assumption
is an economic reason for making blackmail illegal only if the
costs of these consequences outweigh their social benefits. Surely
that is so if we accept Shavelrs invitation to consider only innocent activities. However, there is no warrant for adopting such a
narrow focus.
As Shavell himself recognizes, three categories of "embarrassing" activities might serve as the basis for blackmail: (1)
purely innocent socially harmless acts like "engaging in conventional sexual intercourse with one's spouse, or even taking a
shower"; (2) socially harmful but legal acts such as adultery; and
(3) criminal acts." As to the second category-which surely would
be as numerous as the first 2o--Shavell concludes that the social
value of legalizing blackmail is ambiguous because it is uncertain
whether (a) the beneficial effect of reducing socially undesirable
activities would outweigh the sum of (b) the blackmailer's "wasteful efforts to obtain information" and (c) the victims' costs of

28

Shavell, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1903 (cited in note 23).
Id.

" Id at 1897-99.

One could object that, because everybody is vulnerable to first category blackmail,
its incidence would far exceed that of second category blackmail in a world where blackmail were legalized. I do not think this is the case. In most instances of first category
blackmail, the blackmailer must be threatening, not just to reveal information, but to
publicize tangible evidence. A blackmailer will not get rich, to take Professor Shavelrs example, by threatening to tell a married couple's neighbors and coworkers that the couple
engages in conventional sexual intercourse; as Shavell recognizes, the blackmailer must
threaten to distribute photos of the act. Id at 1897. But this will not be so easy, for laws
(and norms) against privacy invasions would remain operable even under a regime of legal
blackmail. Moreover, the potential payoff from such threats would often be too small to
encourage the practice. Despite Shavelrs examples, the most likely subject of first category blackmail must be innocent, harmless acts that are nonetheless the target of social
prejudice. The incidence of first category blackmail would, therefore, diminish in proportion as general social tolerance increases.
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guarding against blackmail.3 ' We will consider shortly whether
such an ambivalent conclusion about the overall consequentialist
balance warrants much support for a generalized ban on blackmail.3 2 But it is surely not enough to justify cri inalizing adventitious blackmail, for it is implausible that the balance would remain ambiguous when no resources have been expended to obtain
the information in question.' Consequently, Shavell's "incentivebased" response to Lindgren succeeds at most in justifying continued prohibition of adventitious blackmail of innocent conduct
that society has no interest in discouraging.
Therefore, Shavell's contributions notwithstanding, the law
and economics approach still cannot justify prohibiting conditional threats to reveal information about socially undesirable 4
behavior where such information was obtained without cost.35
3' Id at 1899.
See notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
A complete demonstration of this argument would consume more space than the
subject warrants, especially since Shavell never expressly develops the contrary claim. In
simplified form, the argument assumes that, in a regime where all blackmail is criminal,
the discounted cost of detection to a person, P, who engages in second category conduct is
x. Were an exception to the blackmail ban carved out for adventitious blackmail, P would
face an additional discounted cost of detection ofy. Let n equal the costs to P of taking extra precautions to avoid detection, and let m equal the costs to P of foregoing the second
category conduct. For any given P, allowing adventitious blackmail is costly for society, on
Shavell's reasoning, only when (i) x _ n < x + y _<
m. (If x > n, P takes the precautions regardless of whether adventitious blackmail is legalized; if n 'ax + y, P eschews extra precautions even if adventitious blackmail is legalized; if x +y > m, P chooses to forego the activity rather than take additional precautions.) Meanwhile, legalizing adventitious blackmail incurs positive social value if (ii) x : m <x + y. If the values for y are low, events (i)
and (ii) are both fairly unlikely. However, assuming that the benefit to society from any
one P foregoing the activity at issue is greater than the cost to society from any one P
taking extra precautions at cost to him of n, event (i) would have to be considerably more
common than event (ii) for legalizing adventitious blackmail of second category conduct to
be a bad social bargain on Shavell's reasoning. This is not provably false, but seems substantially unlikely.
This argument can be illustrated by considering Shavell's own example of the type of
activity that might form the basis for second category blackmail: "the wasteful but not illegal spending of church funds by a minister." Shavell, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1898 (cited in
note 23). The beneficial effects of permitting blackmail in such cases is clear-to induce
ministers "to use church funds more responsibly." Id at 1899. The principal adverse effect
is 'the effort expended [by profligate ministers] to ... avoid blackmaiL" Id. If, as Shavell
asks us to suppose, "the minister can avoid detection if he goes to the trouble of making all
purchases with cash instead of his credit card," id, how often would the threat of legalized
adventitious blackmail (over and above the threat of detection in a regime that criminalized adventitious blackmail) induce such behavior?
' We will bracket the question of whether law and economics justifies the prohibition
against blackmail based on threats to reveal socially undesirable and illegal behavior
(where the information is obtained with or without expenditure of resources). See Section
I.B.3.
', Acknowledging in a recent article that the economic responses to Lindgren's challenge have been inadequate, Professor Richard McAdams has proposed a "second-best"
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c) Nonadventitious blackmail: the indeterminacy of externalities.
The foregoing analysis does not imply that the economic thesis
succeeds in justifying a ban on blackmail based on information
that is obtained by the expenditure of resources, for the fact (if
true) that a given transaction reduces the aggregate wealth of the
actual parties to the exchange does not prove that the transaction
reduces the overall wealth of society. As Shavell's effort to resuscitate the economic thesis for prohibiting participant and opportunistic blackmail reflects, economists are as concerned with externalities as they are fond of voluntary exchanges. Accordingly,
if the threat and practice of blackmail produced positive externalities (by encouraging socially useful activity or discouraging
socially harmful behavior), then a regime that permitted blackmail might be wealth maximizing relative to a regime that prohibited it.
Indeed, Judge Richard Posner has systematically assessed
the various types of informational blackmail in an effort to evaluate this very possibility."6 Adopting a purportedly exhaustive
seven-part classification of acts or conditions that a blackmailer
might threaten to reveal,'1 Posner concludes that in none of the
economic defense of the criminal ban against adventitious blackmail. See Richard H.
McAdams, GroupNorms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U Pa L Rev 2237, 2266-92 (1996). In
McAdams's view, absent social norms, adventitious blackmail produces a suboptimal dissemination of adventitiously discovered information, while a blackmail ban produces a superoptimal dissemination of such information. However, he argues, norms favoring privacy correct the latter inefficiency better than norms favoring disclosure correct the former. Therefore, criminalization of adventitious blackmail is more efficient than legalization.
Though McAdams's argument is intriguing, its consequences are more far-reaching
than he concedes and than are acceptable. McAdams claims only to "supplement[ I the
economic theory of blackmail" Id at 2287. See also id at 2267 n 82. In fact, his analysis
rests on a very different footing. The economic case against blackmail rests on the premise
that it is appropriate to criminalize conduct that results in deadweight economic losses.
McAdams recognizes that much adventitious blackmail cannot be justified on that principle. Id at 2287. He also eschews reliance on any administrative difficulties of excepting
adventitious blackmail from a general blackmail prohibition. Id at 2270 n 93. Therefore,
the unstated premise of his argument is that it is a sufficient condition for criminalization
that a legal prohibition would likely produce a more "efficient" social distribution of information. It follows that his theory would tolerate an elaborate regime of criminal laws
mandating disclosure of certain categories of information and prohibiting concealment of
others.
See Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev 1817 (cited in note 2).
Posner's categories are as follows: (1) criminal acts for which the blackmailer's victim has been punished; (2) undetected criminal acts; (3) acts that are wrongful, perhaps
tortious, but not criminal; (4) wrongful acts of which the blackmailer (or his principal) was
the victim; (5) disreputable or otherwise censurable acts that do not, however, violate any
enforced law-, (6) involuntary acts or conditions that are a source of potential humiliation;
and (7) any of the first six categories, except that the victim did not commit the act for
which he is being blackmailed. Id at 1820.
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cases could we be confident that there would be a countervailing
social benefit. On this basis, he agrees with the GinsburgShechtman thesis that blackmail is on average wealth reducing
and therefore should be prohibited by the criminal law3
One potential problem with Posner's approach arises from
the fact that his taxonomy is not as exhaustive as he suggests. He
provides no account of threats to do anything other than disclose
information or of demands for something other than pecuniary
gain. More troubling is the questionable nature of some of Posner's central conclusions. For example, Posner concedes that the
social welfare arguments against his "category two" and "category
five" blackmail-threats to reveal that a victim has engaged either in a criminal act for which he was not caught and punished
or in disreputable or immoral acts that do not violate any commonly enforced law-are inconclusive.39 He is able to disfavor legalizing such forms of blackmail, therefore, only by privileging "a
presumption against the expenditure of scarce political capital on
an effort to change laws that are not demonstrably inefficient"
over a contrasting "presumption against government intervention
in private affairs that is not demonstrably efficient."
Although Posner's characteristic candor is commendable, his
argument is doubly odd. First, it is telling that Posner's analysis
yields ambivalent conclusions with regard to these two categories
of blackmail. Most people, I venture, would find criminalizing
both entirely appropriate.41 But it is even more peculiar that Posner is so willing to see both forms of blackmail criminalized notwithstanding the ambivalence of his conclusions-especially
given his explicit recognition of the distinction "between an analytical evaluation and a policy recommendation."42 I suspect that
most readers would read his article to support the very different
conclusion that the economic case against blackmail cannot survive without more rigorous empirical work and predictive modelId at 1818.
U

Id at 1827, 1835. Posner had visited such issues before. See William M. Landes and

Richard A. Posner, The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4 J Legal Stud 1, 42-43 (1975) (considering whether a blackmail threat to reveal that the blackmail victim committed a crime
might increase social utility-and therefore warrant legalization-by reducing other

crimes).
Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1827 (cited in note 2). See also id at 1835 (I[Oince again,
the argument for allowing blackmail is too speculative to make a strong case for decrimi-

nalizing this particular form of extortion.").
4 As further evidence of Posner's departure from common moral intuition, consider his
suggestion that where A is an adulterer, it should be legal for B to threaten to beat him up
unless paid if the data revealed 'that allowing such threats would reduce breaches of the
marital obligation at a cost commensurate with this benefit." Id at 1835.
Id at 1827.
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ling. Unless and until the law and economics scholars can demonstrate more persuasively that blackmail reduces social wealth, it
will remain difficult to reconcile their defense of blackmails
criminalization with their methodology's scientific and positivist
aspirations.
d)

The unbridged gap: why criminalize? Even if nonadventi-

tious blackmail were shown to reduce social wealth, and even if
the theory's apparent failure to cover adventitious blackmail
could be rectified or excused, reliance on considerations of economic efficiency cannot explain why blackmail is not merely discouraged or even prohibited, but criminalized.
From a retributivist perspective, the premise underlying the
economic argument-that economic inefficiency is' a sufficient
condition for imposing criminal punishment-is anathema. Hence
Scott Altman's observation that the economic justification for the
crminalization of blackmail must prove unsatisfactory to "all but
the most committed consequentialist." 4 More significantly,
though, the premise is false even for committed consequentialists.

Because any utilitarian calculus must take into account the pain
suffered by the individual whose liberty and happiness is curtailed for the greater good of others," utilitarianism commands
that society adopt the least restrictive means of social control.
Similarly, under principles of wealth maximization,45 criminalization can be justified only if its incremental deterrent effect compared with other means of deterrence exceeds the greater cost of
employing the criminal law.4" So on both utilitarian and wealth
ma mizing grounds, criminalization of blackmail cannot be justified unless the marginal benefit of criminal sanction-relative,
say, to making blackmail agreements unenforceable as a matter
of contract law (as is presently the case) or making blackmail a
tort---outweigh the marginal social cost.47
Scott Altman, A PatchworkTheory of Blackmail, 141 U Pa L Rev 1639, 1656 (1993).
"See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Introductionto the Principlesof Morals and Legislation 165-74 (Methuen 1970) (originally published in 1789).
"For a brief explanation of the difference between utilitarianism and wealth maximization, see Richard A. Posner, EconomicAnalysis of Law 12-17 (Aspen 5th ed 1998). Very
roughly, utilitarians seek to maximize happiness, defined as the aggregation of private
subjective desires; wealth maximizers seek to maximize efficiency, defined as the assigning of property rights (broadly understood) to those who value them most highly as measured by their willingness and ability to pay for them, taking into account the cost of any
particular assignment.
See, for example, id at 242-50.
While taking for granted that blackmail is properly criminalized, Posner has explored the related question of why it is "punished severely in comparison with other nonviolent thefts." Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1836 (cited in note 2). Criminalizing blackmail,
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The one proponent of the law and economics thesis to have
even attempted the necessary cost-benefit demonstration, Professor Joseph Isenbergh, has concluded that the marginal social
benefit does not outweigh the marginal social cost. Isenbergh begins by observing that "A gains no real control over disclosure
from an unenforceable bargain with B. And if B cannot assure A
of any increased control over disclosure, B cannot extract much
from A, and therefore has little reason to invest much effort in
bargaining.' Therefore, there is likely to be little (nonadventiPosner theorizes, reduces its occurrence by three mechanisms. It
(1) gives the blackmailer an incentive not to reveal the victim's secret after the victim
has complained to the police, which makes such complaints more likely and therefore
blackmail less likely; (2) makes it impossible to conduct blackmail in the open; (3)
prevents the blackmailer from offering his victim a legally enforceable promise of secrecy.
Id at 1840. Posner recognizes that the latter two effects work independently of the severity
of the penalty. He even notes that increasing penalties may actually decrease the deterrent value of the second effect because when blackmail cannot be conducted openly, it is
most likely to be conducted by an intimate of the victim; when the victim and blackmailer
are intimates, proof of the blackmail is more difficult; and when proof is less convincing,
the likelihood that juries will convict stands in inverse proportion to the severity of the
punishment. Id.
Thus, in Posner's argument, attaching severe penalties to blackmail can be justified
only to the extent that the first alleged effect-which depends on Posner's assertion that
the "blackmailer, once caught, usually will keep mum in an effort to obtain leniency," id at
1838-39-outweighs the second. But why would this be? Even putting aside skepticism
that "keeping mum" will be a major element in a plea bargain, the dispositive issue concerns the extent to which the attraction of leniency depends upon the severity of the prescribed penalty. Although Posner does not elaborate on his contention that "(t~he first effect is enhanced by severe punishment,' id at 1840, I suppose it is based on his assumption that the defendant's objective in plea negotiations is to purchase the largest possible
reduction in sentence. If so, the likelihood of reaching a successful plea bargain is enhanced by longer potential sentences: the larger the possible penalty, the greater the deal
the prosecutor can offer. But if the defendant is more interested in the length of the actual
sentence imposed than in the magnitude of the difference between the actual and potential sentences, large penalties on the books can reduce the prospects for reaching a plea
insofar as there exist any institutional and/or psychological constraints on the amount of
time a prosecutor can bargain away. And if the defendant can only be induced to silence
by large relative reductions of sentence, the severity of the prescribed penalty is mostly irrelevant. These are, of course, highly simplified assumptions. They nonetheless suggest
that, if efficiency concerns justify criminalizing blackmail at all, the economic considerations Posner identifies are as likely to weigh in favor of lenient punishment as strict.
' Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1928 (cited in note 13). See also Posner, 141 U Pa L
Rev at 1841 (cited in note 2) (noting that the third of his proposed mechanisms by which
criminalization deters blackmail "could be achieved without criminal law simply by making blackmail contracts unenforceable as a matter of contract law"). This proposition is
slightly more problematic than Isenbergh acknowledges. Making blackmail agreements
unenforceable might substantially deter payment when the blackmailer is not a repeat
performer because the victim could not be sure that the blackmailer would remain silent.
But repeat performers present a different case. Regardless of whether the contract is legally enforceable, the hypothetical blackmail firm that might arise were blackmail decriminalized would find a reputation for trustworthiness critical (the apparent irony not-
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tious) blackmail in a regime that seeks to deter blackmail simply
by making blackmail agreements unenforceable as a matter of
contract law.49
Of course, it is possible that there would be even less blackmail in a regime that made blackmail agreements unenforceable
and barred blackmail through the criminal law. Noting the rarity
of blackmail in the case law, Posner has speculated that the few
reported cases accurately reflect a low incidence of the crime. Anticipating that potential victims would refuse to pay blackmail,
he surmises, a vast number of would-be blackmailers choose not
to risk the criminal penalty." This is unpersuasive. It is more
likely that blackmail is far more frequent than the incidence of
reported cases suggests, and that the low rate of prosecution reflects the substantial willingness of victims to pay. One would expect an economically rational blackmailer to conceive and propose
a blackmail price low enough to reduce substantially the probability that his victim will report the blackmailer to the police
rather than accept the deal. Thus, although the social cost of the
blackmail prohibition is apparently low (commensurate with the
infrequency of prosecution and conviction), the deterrent value of
the criminal ban is likely to be as small or smaller. Because the
goal from an economic standpoint is to achieve not maximum deterrence but optimal deterrence, it is hard to conclude that
blackmairs criminalization is a good buy.
Moreover, the economic case against criminalization may be
even stronger, for the blackmail ban might be positively counterproductive. As Isenbergh has explained,
if blackmail is made a crime, A gains considerable control
over disclosure from entering into a bargain with B, because
B, by incurring the criminal exposure of a blackmailer, can
now. sell A a much higher likelihood of silence .... The
criminal prohibition of blackmail, therefore, makes the

withstanding). Such an entity would find ways to make its guarantee of silence credible.
But this observation still does not warrant criminalization, for there are other ways to discourage Epstein's "Blackmail, Inc." (discussed in Section I-42 below). For instance, in addition to making blackmail contracts void, the state could ban blackmail advertising
and/or withhold the benefits of incorporation from firms engaged in blackmailing.
"' This conclusion is further reinforced when we re-examine Posner's three proposed
mechanisms by which criminalization deters blackmail. As noted above, Posner himself
recognizes that the third mechanism can be achieved without criminalization. See Posner,
141 U Pa L Rev at 184041 (cited in note 2). Depending upon the degree of moral censure
attaching to blackmail, the second mechanism could as well.
Id at 1841.
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blackmail bargains entered into across the threshold of prohibition highly enforceable.51
And if the would-be blackmailer anticipates that a consummated
bargain will be meaningfully enforceable, he is more likely to
commit the resources necessary to undertake the activity.
In short, making blackmail a criminal offense might deter
some blackmail that would not be deterred in a regime that
merely made the blackmail contracts unenforceable. But, if so, its
deterrent effect is likely to be small. The ban might be moderately efficient or moderately inefficient. On the other hand,
criminalizing blackmail might even increase its incidence. In that
event, resort to the criminal law is inefficient-maybe substantially so. Given such indeterminacy, the proposition (necessary to
the economic justification for criminalization) that the expected
value of criminalizing blackmail is positive seems highly dubious.
*

*

*

The foregoing analysis supports three conclusions about the
law and economics argument on blackmail. First, the economic
approach fails to justify prohibitions against adventitious blackmail. Second, whether other major forms of blackmail are truly
disadvantageous on law and economics principles is far from certain once one takes externalities into proper account. Third, it is
unlikely that the economic argument warrants resort to the
criminal law. Accepting the first and third of these conclusions,
Isenbergh has argued that the law can adequately deter any inefficiency blackmail causes simply by making contracts of silence
entered into between a blackmailer and his victim void and unenforceable, except for contracts involving adventitious blackmail.52
But if the economic approach to the blackmail puzzle leads
ultimately to Isenbergh, then we should look elsewhere to solve
it. For although he concludes confidently that "It]here is no other
way to explain the law of blackmail,"53 Isenbergh's radical proposals to decriminalize certain types of blackmail reveal that the
economists' purported explanation is no justification. Before we

agree that commercial research, and even entrepreneurial,
blackmail should be freed from the criminal law's grasp, we

"' Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1928 (cited in note 13).
' More precisely, in light of the difficulty in ascertaining whether given information
was costlessly obtained, Isenbergh would, as a proxy, make all contracts to remain silent
enforceable if the parties knew each other before the blackmail bargain. He would also
make an exception to that exception in cases where the blackmail contract concerns silence about the commission of torts or crimes. Id at 1925-32.
u Id at 1921.
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would do well to search for an account more in tune with current
law and common intuition.
2. Richard Epstein: blackmail as the "hand-maiden to
corruption and deceit."
Professor Richard Epstein has proposed a different consequentalist solution to the blackmail puzzle. Although himself a
prominent law and economics scholar, Epstein's specific concern
is not the deadweight economic losses that trouble Posner, Ginsburg, and Coase. Instead, Epstein argues that blackmail is criminal because it has a necessary tendency to induce other acts of
theft and deception, the criminalization of which is wholly unpuzzling. 4 This difference notwithstanding, Epstein's theory suffers
from some of the same flaws as does the argument from economic
efficiency.
Epstein "begin[s] with a brief account of the moral theory of
criminal responsibility' 55 -to wit, that there is no criminal liability without mens rea and actus reus. Blackmail, he concludes,
easily satisfies the mens rea requirement, for "It]he element of intent is always present in vivid form." 6 But the actus reus requirement presents a problem. Only the threat or use of force or
fraud can satisfy it, Epstein argues, 7 and blackmail (ordinarily)
involves neither. 8 One could "argue that the threat to disclose is
illegal precisely because the disclosure itself, if made, ought to be
illegal."59 But this argument fails, Epstein concludes, because it
"jettisons the basic theory of criminal responsibility by holding
that deliberate acts, not involving the use of force or fraud, may
themselves be regarded as criminal." °
Epstein maintains that the solution to the blackmail puzzle
appears when one imagines a world in which blackmail were legalized:
" Epstein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 553 (cited in note 2). Precisely why the traditional, unproblematic, crimes should be criminal is not clear from Epstein's essay. As we will see,
however, Epstein's account of blackmail is incompatible with any plausible justification
(beyond his own idiosyncratic interpretation of the actus reus and mens rea requirements)
for the criminalization of common law larceny offenses.

Id at 555.
6Id.

Id at 555-57.
Epstein notes that blackmail can contain force or fraud, as, for example, when the
blackmailer threatens to disclose information gleaned from stolen documents. Id at 558.
But in such a case, making blackmail criminal presents no puzzle, for "[i]t is easy to regard blackmail as a criminal offense whenever the disclosure is itself regarded as wrongful." Id.

Id at 560.
Id.
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[T]here would then be an open and public market for a new
set of social institutions to exploit the gains from this new
form of legal activity. Blackmail, Inc. could with impunity
place advertisements in the newspaper offering to acquire for
top dollar any information with the capacity to degrade or
humiliate persons
in the eyes of their families or business
61
associates.
The existence of Blackmail, Inc. would produce at least two undesirable consequences, Epstein claims. First, the greater prevalence of blackmail would lead to more blackmail victims and, consequently, greater incidences of theft and fraud by victims desperate to obtain the funds necessary to pay the blackmailer.62
Second, because Blackmail, Inc. would "recognize[ ] that its ability to extract future payments from [the victim] depends upon
[the third party to whom the disclosure would be made] being
kept in the dark," it would "instruct [the victim] in the proper
way to arrange his affairs in order to keep the disclosures from
being made.' In short, Epstein concludes, "[b]lackmail is made a
crime not only because of what it is, but because of what it necessarily leads to.... [It is the handmaiden to corruption and deceit.' o
Epstein's conclusion, however, does not follow from his
analysis. The real thrust of Blackmail, Inc. is that blackmail is
properly made a crime not because of "what it is," but only because of its consequences. Epstein's assertion that force and fraud
exhaust the concerns of the criminal law necessarily entails that
criminalization of blackmail would be impermissible (given that
blackmail does not itself constitute fraud or force) but for the
fraudulent conduct it engenders. In other words, Epstein's theory
provides not only that the systemic consequences he identifies are
sufficient for imposition of criminal liability as a general matter,
but also that those consequences constitute a necessary condition
for imposition of criminal liability in the particular case of blackmail. Were this true, the proper scope of the crime of blackmail
would be substantially narrower than it is at present. Consider,
for example, a blackmail proposal in which the blackmailer demands sexual favors for the nondisclosure of embarrassing information that the victim has no moral obligation to divulge (such
as her own illegitimate birth). This form of blackmail would nei61

Id at 562.

Id at 564.
Id.
" Id at 566.
'
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ther induce the victim to engage in theft or fraud nor encourage
any "deception" that society has a legitimate interest in deterring. Under Epstein's reasoning, it should not be criminalized.'
A second problem with Epstein's theory is that the claim
upon which it rests-that force and fraud demarcate the criminal
law's proper reach-is extremely dubious. Even aside from "victimless" offenses such as gambling, prostitution, and drug use,
criminalization of which is notoriously suspect on liberal principles, the state makes numerous activities criminal that appear
not to involve either force or fraud. These offenses cover a wide
range of conduct from statutory rape to indecent exposure to larceny by stealth. Conceivably, Epstein could respond either by articulating conceptions of force and fraud sufficiently expansive to
encompass all of the foregoing activities or by explaining why it is
morally unjustifiable for the state to make such conduct criminal.
But he has not done so.
Finally, the internal logic of Epstein's theory is fundamentally flawed. Epstein maintains (1) that the "basic," "moral" theory of criminal law holds that acts not involving force or fraud
may not themselves be criminalized, and (2) that actions that induce force and fraud may also be criminalized." This second principle is frustratingly underdeveloped." More profoundly, these
two principles are not compatible: claim (2) empties claim (1) of
any meaningful moral content.
Epstein claims that it is morally wrongful for the state to
punish people for engaging in nonforceful, nonfraudulent actions.
This assertion must rest on reasons, even though Epstein does
not state what they are. Those reasons will be either deontological or consequentialist in nature. A deontologic reason would be
that people have a moral right to be free from punishment by the
state for actions not involving force or fraud, no matter what the
consequences. But Epstein's second principle is inconsistent with
this justification-it allows the state to punish acts outside these
areas, if they lead to force or fraud. So claim (1) must rest on consequentialist reasons. But if Epstein allows such reasons, his arUnless, that is, the practical difficulties in excepting such cases from a general
blackmail ban would be insurmountable or too costly-a contention Epstein does not
make.
Epstein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 555, 565-66 (cited in note 2).
Consider, for instance, the pricing and marketing strategies of major sneaker manu-

facturers. Though we might not have predicted it ex ante, we now know that kids rob and
kill for other kids' sneakers and for the money with which to buy sneakers. Under Epsteins principle, we could make it a criminal offense for Nike to advertise in inner cities or
to price Air Jordans far out of the comfortable reach of the average low-income adolescent
male. And the standards by which to measure whether we should are not at all apparent.
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ticulation of "the moral theory of criminal responsibility" seems
too narrow: in principle, anything that leads to the same types of
consequences as acts of force and fraud could be made criminal.
This conclusion could be avoided, I think, only by adopting a consequentialist moral theory in which acts of force and fraud constitute the essential, irreducible units of measurement. Why this
should be, though, is a mystery. Unfortunately, Epstein provides
no explanation himself. It follows, then, that Epstein's assertion
that "deliberate acts, not involving the use of force or fraud may
[not] themselves be regarded as criminal' must be understood
either as a descriptive claim (in which case, as we have seen, it
would be false) or as a rule of prudence; it is not a statement of
politico moral obligation.
In sum, Epstein's theory fails for three reasons. First, it
would leave a significant subset of blackmail-that which neither
induces the victim to engage in theft or fraud nor encourages any
deception-uncriminalizable. Second, it rests on the questionable
moral principle that force or fraud should be necessary conditions
for criminalization. Third, and fatally, were Epstein nonetheless
correct that force or fraud should be necessary conditions for imposing criminal punishment, his further claim that it is morally
justifiable to criminalize conduct that is not itself forceful or
fraudulent, if that conduct encourages other acts of force or fraud,
cannot be sustained.
3.

Jeffrie Murphy: blackmail encourages invasions
of privacy.

A third theory, proposed by Professor Jeffrie Murphy,6 9 exhibits similarities to both of the approaches already discussed.
Like Epstein, Murphy focuses on the antisocial conduct that legalizing blackmail might encourage. Like proponents of the
deadweight loss hypothesis, Murphy seems principally driven to
explain and justify the distinction between blackmail and "other
hard economic transactions."70 Like both earlier approaches, however, Murphy's theory is substantially underinclusive and rests
on contestable premises.
Murphy proceeds in three steps. He begins with twin assumptions about the moral underpinnings of the criminal law:
The first is that immorality should be a necessary condition
for criminalization but not a sufficient condition. The second
Epstein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 560 (cited in note 2).
See Murphy, 63 Monist 156 (cited in note 2).
70Id at 156.
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is that utilitarian considerations, though unsatisfactory in
explicating the concept of immorality, are a reasonable basis
on which to answer the question "Which of all immoral actions should be criminalized?"7 1

He then asserts that blackmail and hard economic transactions
"are both intrinsically immoral (and immoral for the same reason-e.g., taking an unfair advantage of the victim's vulnerability). 2 Third, he explains that utilitarian considerations support
(1) criminalizing the blackmail of persons who are not public figures, because legalized blackmail would create a new incentive to
invade the privacy of average persons,73 and (2) not criminalizing
hard economic transactions, because there is no apparent way to

draw objectively sensible and enforceable lines between immoral
and moral transactions.7
One problem with Murphy's theory should be apparent. As
Lindgren has pointed out, Murphy's theory cannot justify criminalizing participant and opportunistic blackmail, because any in-

vasions of privacy such forms of blackmail occasion would be unaffected by blackmail laws.75 There is, however, a far greater difficulty: Murphy's theory cannot survive on a bare assertion that
blackmail is immoral because it takes unfair advantage of a vic-

Id at 163.
Id.
Noting that substantial economic incentives to invade the privacy of "public figures"
already exist, Murphy would generally permit blackmail of such figures at rates that do
not exceed the market price for the information in question. However, because concealing
embarrassing information about some public figures can be harmful to the legitimate interests of a democratic citizenry, Murphy would bar even the "market price" blackmail of
"public officials." Id at 164-65.
72

7' Id at 163-66.
' Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 690 (cited in note 2). Lindgren levels three other criticisms at Murphy's theory. According to Lindgren: (1) Murphy errs by assuming there is no
market for embarrassing information about private individuals: spouses, employers, credit
agencies, and potential business associates are all interested in details about nonpublic
figures; (2) Murphy's proposed exception for market price blackmail is unconvincing and
morally unacceptable; and (3) there is much embarrassing information about public officials the concealment of which appears morally unproblematic. Id at 692-94.
These latter three objections do not cut as sharply as Lindgren believes. First, that
there is some market for embarrassing information about private individuals seems irrelevant. Murphy could respond that blackmail should be criminal so as not to increase
substantially the existing incentives for privacy invasion. Second, intuitions about market
price blackmail are more diverse than Lindgren assumes. See Section mI.B.2. Third, Murphy concedes that some embarrassing information about public officials is not relevant to
the public, but suggests that here line-drawing difficulties weigh in favor of the rule he
crafts. Murphy, 63 Monist at 164 (cited in note 2). Lindgren provides no compelling reason
to disagree with Murphy's judgment on this point.
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tim's vulnerability.7' Consider the example Murphy offers of a
paradigmatic "hard economic transaction":
I know that your son, whom you love more than anything
else in the world, is dying of leukemia. I also know two other
things: (1) that he is a great baseball fan who would love to
have a baseball autographed by Babe Ruth to cheer him
during his final days and (2) that $6,000 is all the money you
have in the world. Now I happen to own the last such baseball available in the world, and I will make you a proposition-namely, to sell you this baseball for $6,000. 7"
That does sound hard. And let us agree that it is immoral as
well. But Murphy does not claim that the baseball owner has a
moral obligation to give the baseball to the dying boy. Presumably the owner is morally free to sell it to the boy's parents for a
"fair" price. Additionally, there would seem to be circumstances in
which other dispositions of the baseball would also be immoral
because "unfair," such as dropping it in the Pacific Ocean.
This has several consequences for Murphy's theory of blackmail. First, if the baseball owner is morally free to sell his property for a fair price, the blackmailer should be too, whether that
price is set by the "market" or by another means. That is, "the
morality of the criminal law" would seem to forbid criminalization of what might be termed "fair-price blackmail." Second, if it
might be immoral for the baseball owner to refuse to deal with
the boy's parents, it might be immoral for someone in possession
of embarrassing information to reveal it instead of becoming a
blackmailer.
These last objections are telling. Murphy is most readily
grouped among those who would justify criminalizing blackmail
on consequential grounds, for he emphasizes the ways that
blackmail laws can encourage or discourage invasions of privacy.
And yet he explicitly premises his theory on both deontological
and utilitarian concerns. Ultimately, the most revealing aspect of
his theory lies in its unexamined deontological basis. That the
blackmail proposal is "unfair"-let alone why it is unfair-is far
from transparently obvious. Murphy's "preliminary inquiry" rein7 In fairness, Murphy does not say that "taking an unfair advantage of the victim's

vulnerability" constitutes the whole of the immorality of blackmail and hard economic

transactions; he says only that it is an example of their immorality. Murphy, 63 Monist at
163 (cited in note 2). But if there are other ways in which blackmail is "intrinsically immoral," id, Murphy does not hint at what they may be.
Id at 156-57.
Id at 163.
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forces the need to study carefully the arguments for blackmail's
intrinsic immorality; blackmail's wrongfulness cannot be blithely
assumed.
B. Blackmail as an Inherent Wrong: Of Unconditional Acts and
Conditional Threats
As demonstrated, the consequentialist theories suffer from
various analytical faults. Beyond that, they fail even to approximate common intuitions regarding what's wrong with blackmail.
It should be no surprise, therefore, that many other theorists
start from the assumption that blackmail is properly criminal because it is a nonconsequential moral wrong. Their challenge is to
explain why the threat is wrong in a way that either distinguishes the threat from the unconditional performance of the act
threatened or explains why unconditional performance of the act
threatened should also be criminal. This Section considers four
very different efforts to answer this challenge.
1.

Feinberg and Gorr: the wrongful act.

In Harmless Wrongdoing, Professor Joel Feinberg advances a
complex and nuanced argument that, at its core, argues that the
morality of blackmail is a function of the morality of the act that
the blackmailer threatens or offers.79 Under this view, the key is
to determine whether unconditional performance of the act
threatened or offered by the blackmailer would be wrongful. If so,
blackmail is likewise wrongful,"° and wrongful to that same degree. Because blackmail, as a species of theft, is also harmcausing, it is consistent with liberal principles to make it criminal. Correspondingly, if neither the act threatened nor the act offered is wrongful, then the conditional blackmail proposition is
also not wrongful and may not be made criminal.
Two illustrations are helpful. Because it is clearly wrongful
not to report the identity of someone who has committed a felony,
there would be nothing puzzling or problematic about criminalizing the conditional offer not to report a crime. (That society
might opt not to criminalize unconditional performance of the

Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 240-58 (cited in note 2). Feinberg speaks of acts
"threatened" and "offered" in recognition of the fact that blackmail is always a double conditional proposition of the form: if-x theny; and ifx then -y, where the first statement is a
"threat" and the second is an "offer."
' Although he recognizes numerous cases of "justified blackmail," id at 258-74, Feinberg presents them as piecemeal exceptions, not as examples shedding any light on the
nature of the puzzle.
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underlying wrongful act is irrelevant, according to Feinberg; it is
enough that society could reasonably decide to impose either
criminal or civil sanctions."1 ) In contrast, Feinberg argues, a person who comes to learn of another's adultery will often have neither a moral duty to reveal that fact nor a moral duty to remain
silent. Consequently, society could not justifiably impose a legal
obligation, criminal or civil, upon persons either to disclose or not
to disclose the commission of adultery. It follows, Feinberg concludes, that the corresponding blackmail 8proposal-call
it "adul2
tery blackmail"--should be decriminalized.
Given that adultery blackmail might well be a modal case of
the crime, Feinberg's conclusion is startling. Michael Gorr has
tried to salvage Feinberg's basic approach by showing why it actually supports the morally intuitive conclusion that adultery
blackmail is properly criminalized.1 Gorr begins by asserting,
contrary to Feinberg, that every act likely to arise in situations
involving blackmail is either morally obligatory or morally prohibited. He agrees that society should not impose a legal duty either to disclose or not to disclose adultery, but bases his conclusion on epistemic uncertainty: we may not know whether the consequences of such a disclosure would be morally beneficial or
would cause unnecessary misery," and we may lack necessary information "about the prior distribution of moral rights and duties
among the related parties.' But for these considerations, Gorr
argues,
there would be a morally conclusive reason for imposing on
third-party observers a legal requirement either to report the
occurrence of adultery or (depending upon the circumstances) to refrain from reporting its occurrence. It follows
that, in the absence of such concerns, there would also be a
morally conclusive reason for prohibiting the corresponding
blackmail proposals since these would constitute attempts to
8 In a similar vein, Professor Arthur Goodhart years earlier sought, by distinguishing
between moral and immoral liberties, to downplay the lawfulness of the act a blackmailer
threatens to perform. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudenceand the Common
Law 175-89 (Cambridge 1931). He concluded that it is blackmail when the act threatened,
though lawful, is immoral. Unfortunately, Goodhares conception of immoral liberties appears much like Justice Stewares conception of obscenity-although he may have known
it when he saw it, he did not provide the tools necessary for others to draw the difficult
lines. See Jacobellisv Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart concurring).
Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 246-49 (cited in note 2).
See Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 Phil & Pub Aff 43
(1992).
Id at 55.
Id at 56, quoting Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoingat 248 (cited in note 2).
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acquire some of the adulterer's assets either by offering to
conceal what ought morally to be disclosed or by threatening
to disclose what ought morally to be concealed. But, ex hypothesi, although such difficulties do serve to inhibit us from
imposing duties with respect to the mere disclosure or nondisclosure of the adulterer's activities, they do not prevent us
from imposing duties not to engage in the blackmailing of
such persons."
The crux of Gorr's claim appears to be that Feinberg errs by
focusing seriatim on each leg of the double conditional that constitutes a blackmail proposal. We might not know which of the
two acts-the one threatened or the one offered-would be immoral, but we do know that one of them must be. Consequently,
adultery blackmairs wrongfulness derives neither from the act
threatened nor from the act offered (because either might be
morally permissible), but from the blackmailer's communicating a
threat that will commit him to either divulging or remaining silent, depending on his victim's response. Adultery blackmail is
wrongful, then, because the blackmailer knowingly takes an unjustifiable risk of committing an immoral act.
But this is surely wrong. Even accepting for the sake of argument Gorr's dubious assumption that one of the options must
be-from a God's eye perspective-the morally obligatory course
of action, the fact that the adultery blackmailer commits herself,
at the moment of her threat, to risking an immoral act does not
entail that taking that risk is itself an immoral act. Recall Gorr's
moral-consequentialist claim that the effects of disclosure are
morally relevant and that those effects may be difficult or impossible to predict. It follows that even the prospective discloser herself might not know whether her moral duty is to disclose or not
to disclose. And if we do not believe that an actor knows where
her moral duty lies, it makes no sense to hold her morally culpable for risking violation of that duty. Otherwise, any decisionmaking strategy one might use in a morally uncertain situationfrom flipping a coin to delegating the choice to a third partywould be morally equivalent to blackmail. Because Gorr provides
no reason for believing this is so,87 his effort to salvage Feinberg's
thesis fails."
Gorr, 21 Phil & Pub Aff at 56-57 (cited in note 83).
At least one theorist has intimated that a coin toss is the morally preferable decisionmaking strategy for those forced to choose between harms in cases of moral uncertainty. See John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 Phil & Pub Aff 293, 303
(1977).
"Some threads of Gorr's analysis do hint toward a departure from Feinberg's belief
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Lindgren and Fletcher: the wrongful threat.

At the opposite pole from Feinberg and Gorr stand Professors
James Lindgren and George Fletcher. Whereas the former pair
contend that the blackmail proposal is morally equivalent to the
act threatened or offered, the latter argue-for vastly different
reasons-that the key to the blackmail puzzle inheres entirely in
the wrongfulness of the threat.
In a highly influential 1984 article, Lindgren claimed to solve
the blackmail puzzle by observing that the blackmail threat differs from ordinary and legitimate threats, such as a threat "to sell
to someone else unless the buyer agrees to pay the price demanded," in that only the former involves using for one's gain
leverage that properly belongs to another (for example, the adulterer's spouse).89 What makes the blackmailer's conduct distinct
from legitimate threats, and therefore wrongful, Lindgren argues,
"is that he interposes himself parasitically in an actual or potential dispute in which he lacks a sufficiently direct interest. What
right has he to make money by settling other people's claims?' °
At the heart of blackmail, then, is the triangular nature of
the transaction, and particularly this disjunction between
the blackmailer's personal benefit and the interests of the
third parties whose leverage he uses. In effect, the blackmailer attempts to gain an advantage in return for suppressing someone else's actual or potential interest. The
blackmailer is negotiating for his own gain with someone
else's leverage or bargaining chips.9
Lindgren's approach has been subjected to extensive criticism that need not be repeated here in full. " While Lindgren's
theory enjoys claims to rough-though surely not perfect 93-- dethat the unconditional act and the conditional threat are morally equivalent. If Gorr
means to claim that an "attempt to acquire some of the adulterer's assets" is itself a
wrongful act that makes the blackmail proposal morally worse than the acts threatened
and offered, his argument approximates Leo Katz's (discussed in Section I.B.3) and suffers
from the same failings.
Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 701 (cited in note 2).
Id at 702.
Id.
See, for example, Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U Pa
L Rev 1567, 1580-81 (1993); DeLong, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1681-88 (cited in note 11); Walter
Block and David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Epstein, Nozick andLindgren, 19 Loyola LA L Rev 37, 51-54 (1985).
Consider, for example, a threat by Nazis to march in Skokie unless the town's residents buy them off with a large cash payment. I assume that this is blackmail. If so, the
Nazis are merely leveraging their own constitutional rights, which they are threatening to
exercise as an instrument of cruelty towards the town's many Holocaust survivors. (It
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scriptive accuracy, its normative appeal is extremely weak, as
Lindgren himself has conceded,' because he provides no reason
why using someone else's leverage for individual gain should be
unlawful, let alone criminal. Furthermore, if the use of such leverage or "chips" is wrongful, it is not clear why squanderinganother's chips-by neither threatening nor making a given disclosure-is not likewise wrongful and thus properly criminal. 5
Whereas Lindgren's theory amounts to an insightful description in futile search of a normative rationale, Fletcher relies on a
novel and explicit theory of crime and punishment.' The core
concern of the criminal law, he ventures, is to deter and negate
conditions of dominance and subordination. If so, there is no
reason to criminalize the mere disclosure of embarrassing information. Once undertaken, the disclosure is over and done with.
The blackmail threat to disclose the same information is another
story. Precisely because of "the prospect of repeated demands,"98
blackmail tends to create a continuing relationship of dominance
and submission. In consequence, blackmail "is not an anomalous
crime but rather a paradigm for understanding both criminal
wrongdoing and punishment.'
Though provocative, Fletcher's theory runs into a host of difficulties. Maybe the least troubling difficulty concerns Fletcher's
foundational theory of crime and punishment. As Fletcher acknowledges, not all crimes-homicide is an obvious example-appear to implicate relationships of dominance and subordination."o
Second, even if negating dominance is of fundamental, perhaps defining, importance to the criminal law, Fletcher's theory
is underinclusive. In response to the objection "that if the aftermath of the alleged blackmail is the determinative factor," the
crime should be defined "as the second act of blackmail," Fletcher
emphasizes that "the relationship of dominance and subordination comes into being as a result of the victim's making the first
payment or engaging in the first coerced act of submission. The

could be argued that the Nazis are really leveraging the informational interests of the
public-within or without Skokie-that might wish to view the march. But this is a forced
and artificial construction. The public could not compel the Nazis to march if they chose
not to, nor could the Nazis be viewed as having even a weak moral obligation to march.)
See Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1988 (cited in note 3).
See Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1917 n 35 (cited in note 13).
"George P. Fletcher, Blackmail:The ParadigmaticCrime, 141 U Pa L Rev 1617, 1618
(1993).
Id at 1629-35.
Id at 1626.
Id at 1617.
1
"Id at 1635.
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dominance consists in the knowledge that the victim is now fair
game for repeated demands. Dominance and subordination are
states of anticipation."' While this may be so, Fletcher's theory
remains underinclusive insofar as it cannot justify criminalizing
blackmail proposals that do not reasonably create apprehension
of repeated demands. Consider a judicial nominee who has committed some minor indiscretion in his past-say he smoked
marijuana, and inhaled-for which he is not ashamed but the
disclosure of which he (rightly) fears might doom his nomination.
Assume that Blackmailer approaches Nominee on the eve of the
confirmation vote and threatens to disclose his prior drug use to
the Senate unless Nominee pays $10,000. If he does not fear disclosure after his confirmation, Nominee may accede to the demand without initiating a submissive relationship. Under
Fletcher's theory, Blackmailer's conduct should not be criminalized-a conclusion contrary to prevailing law as well as, I would
suspect, to common moral intuition.
The third problem with Fletcher's argument is the most profound. Properly, Fletcher does not aver that a relationship of
dominance and subordination is sufficient to justify criminal
punishment. After all, innumerable relationships-parent and
child, employer and employee, teacher and student, etc.-exhibit
aspects of dominance and subordination, yet raise no suspicion in
the eyes of the law. Indeed, some such relationships-such as
prison guard and inmate-are products of the criminal law. The
existence of such a dynamic cannot be a sufficient condition for
criminalization. As one of Fletcher's critics objected, "It must be
the case, therefore, that the blackmailer's actions are somehow
intrinsically wrong and unjustified." °2 Fletcher appears to agree
with this observation, but does not believe it has any critical
force:
Many words and expressions at hand express what is wrong
with blackmail. In fact, too many things are wrong with it.
Blackmail represents coercion of the victim, exploitation of
the victim's weakness, and trading unfairly in assets or chips
that belong to others. It represents an undesirable and abusive form of private law enforcement. It leads to the waste of
resources so far as blackmailers are induced to collect information that they are willing to suppress for a fee.'03

,01Id at 1637-38.
" Id at 1636-37 (noting objection raised by Stephen Latham).
'Id.
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In short, Fletcher seems to suggest, of course blackmail is wrong

and unjustified.
But Fletcher's litany of blackmails evils cannot do the work
he expects of it precisely because each (loaded) observation is so
hotly contested. What makes blackmail "coercive" or "exploitative" in a morally meaningful sense? Why is trading on another's
chips "unfair"? What moral significance should we attribute to
the fact, if true, that, on balance, blackmail wastes resources? As
this Section endeavors to demonstrate, these are challenging
questions. Mere reference to theories that elicit, but do not convincingly resolve, them cannot answer what Fletcher seems to
acknowledge is the crucial question for his theory: what about the
blackmailer's actions creates a wrongful type of dominance?
3.

Katz: the punishment puzzle.

A middle ground between the poles defined by Feinberg and
Gorr on the one hand and Lindgren and Fletcher on the other has
been carved out by Leo Katz in his imaginative contribution to
° In contrast to Feinberg and Gorr, Katz
the blackmail debate.'O
asserts that blackmail is morally worse than the act threatened.
Unlike Lindgren and Fletcher, Katz denies that the act threatened might be a moral right. Instead, he insists that the act a
blackmailer leverages into his threat is (1) a moral wrong, and (2)
a relatively minor one at that. °5 He thus restates the blackmail
puzzle as follows: "If revealing the infidelities is only a minor
immorality, then how can the taking of money which the victim
prefers to that minor immorality be anything more than a minor

immorality itself?""° More generally, given that a blackmail proposal consists of two analytically distinct elements-the blackmailer's threatened act and his attempt to secure the victim's resources-why should it be assigned the greater moral and legal
censure that attaches to the latter element alone?
Katz responds to this question by introducing, and proposing
to resolve, what he calls the "punishment puzzle," a conundrum
he illustrates with the following hypothetical: Smithy the burglar
breaks into Bartleby's house to commit larceny. Inside, he demands that Bartleby divulge the combination to his safe and
threatens to beat Bartleby senseless if he does not comply.
" See Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev 1567 (cited in note 92).
"See, for example, id at 1597 ('The blackmailer puts the victim to a choice between a
theft (or some other criminal encroachment) and some other, minor wrong....
To be sure,
the wrong must not be too minor.... But it need not-and this is the crucial point-be an
immorality that comes anywhere close to being criminal.").
" Id at 1598 (emphasis altered).
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Bartleby declares that he cannot bear to part with the items in
his safe (which have only sentimental value) and regrets that he
will have to submit to the beating. Smithy batters Bartleby savagely and leaves. When Louie the burglar breaks into Bartleby's
house the next night, the identical scenario transpires-with one
exception. Just as Louie is about to strike Bartleby, he notices a
scrap of paper containing the safe's combination. Despite
Bartleby's plea that he would rather be pummeled than lose his
goods, Louie opens the safe and leaves with the contents. 7
The law, of course, would punish Smithy the batterer more
severely than Louie the thief, and Katz approves. The criminal
law, he argues, should not take account of a victim's idiosyncratic
preferences. Whereas victims are concerned solely with harm, the
law is concerned with the defendant's culpability, of which harm
is but a minor ingredient." Hence "the lesson of the punishment
puzzle": "when the defendant has the victim choose between either
of two immoralities which he must endure, the gravity of the defendant's wrongdoing is to be judged by what he actually did (or
sought to achieve), not by what he threatened to do.""° Smithy is
punished more severely than Louie because battery is morally
worse than theft. For the same reason, the law rightly views
blackmail in light of what the blackmailer intends to do-take
money from one who does not want to part with it. Thus, to Katz,
blackmail is a form of robbery-a graver offense than the act
threatened."0
For all the wit and insight of Katz's effort, it fails to solve the
blackmail puzzle. Katz simply asserts that the act the blackmailer threatens is immoral. However, as Lindgren has objected,
"this merely assumes away the paradox, which is in part that often what the blackmailer threatens to do is a moral right.""'
While Lindgren's claim that the threatened act is often moral
demands qualification (because the act's moral status is far more
complex and contingent than he recognizes"'), his general point
still holds: whether the act threatened is a moral right or a moral
wrong (or something else) cannot be simply assumed without argument."1
' Id at 1582-83.
"MIdat 1590.
" Id at 1598.
..Id at 1599.

. Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1977 (cited in note 3).
..See Section II.
..Even if Katz is correct that the act threatened is wrongful, his further contention
that the threat is less wrongful than what the blackmailer "actually did (or sought to
achieve)" is unpersuasive. See text accompanying notes 188-91. We need a more developed
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Nozick: blackmail as coercion.

All of the nonconsequentialists are driven to explain why the
blackmail threat is a moral wrong. In addition, each of the theorists so far discussed considers the moral status of the acts a
blackmailer might threaten. The final theory here addressedwhich derives from Professor Robert Nozick's seminal study of
coercion" 4-does not. This oversight is significant. Instead of
solving the blackmail puzzle, the coercion thesis further
complicates the moral relationship between the conditional threat
(or offer) that constitutes blackmail and the unconditional
performance of the act threatened (or offered).
Nozick's most familiar remarks on blackmail appear in his
1974 classic, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, during a brief exploration of the concept of "productive exchange."" 5 Most voluntary
transactions are "productive" in the sense that they make both
parties better off. Nozick proposes that an exchange between A
and B is unproductive under the following circumstances: (1) A is
no better off as a result of the transaction than if he had nothing
to do with B; and (2) if B's part of the transaction consists solely
of abstaining from performing some action, x, B did not propose to
perform x solely to sell A his abstention." 6 Blackmail, he notes, is
one example of an unproductive exchange." 7
If this discussion is to be read as an argument for blackmail's
crminalization, two problems arise. First, it presents an inaccurate description of blackmail: the victim may prefer that the
blackmailer exists. Imagine that Adulterer dumps Mistress, who
then decides to reveal their affair to Wife. However, an advertisement for Blackmail, Inc. causes her to reconsider. Although
she would like to hurt her ex-lover, a possible windfall is also attractive. She sells her love letters to the professionals who in turn
sell them to Adulterer. Adulterer's acceptance of the blackmail of-

theory than Katz provides to understand why the blackmailer's attempt to secure his victim's resources is necessarily more wrongful than the act threatened.
...
Although traced to Nozick, this basic approach has been elaborated by others. See,
for example, Altman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1640-51 (cited in note 43).
"'Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 84-87 (cited in note 2).
"Id at 84-85. Gorr articulates Nozick's definition in similar terms. See Michael Gorr,
Nozick's Argument Against Blackmail, 58 Personalist 187, 188 (1977). The principal difference between Gorr's definition and that presented in the text is that Gorr does not present the second criterion as a conditional. Under Gorr's definition, it is a sine qua non of
an unproductive exchange that one of the parties sells forbearance from an act; in other
words, if forbearance is not part of the transaction, the transaction cannot be unproductive. Nozick does not address this point explicitly. As note 127 indicates, however, I think
Gorr's is not the better view.
... Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 85-86 (cited in note 2).
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fer is arguably conclusive evidence that he is better off because of
the blackmailer."8 This blackmail transaction is not unproductive.
Second, assuming that the blackmail deal is unproductive,
the question remains why it should be illegal, let alone criminal.
We expect consequentialists to disfavor such transactions. But, as
we have seen, not even the law and economics theorists have
credibly justified blackmail's criminalization. How Nozick could
find such a justification, compatible with his libertarianism, is
hard to fathom. As Gorr has argued, "the reasons which Nozick
offers for prohibiting 'unproductive' exchanges could not plausibly
be made to cohere with the principles that are generally taken to
underlie a libertarian society."" 9
This is a powerful objection. Indeed, it is so forceful as to invito us to question whether Nozick is in fact arguing that unproductive exchanges are ipso facto criminalizable. Unfortunately,
Nozick is not entirely clear on this point. Careful attention to the
structure of his argument, however, suggests that he does not
mean to argue that the unproductiveness of an exchange is sufficient for the state to make it criminal.
The productive exchange test serves a very different function. Assume an action would violate the natural rights of others
or, in Nozick's terms, would cross a moral boundary. May the
state prohibit the action, Nozick asks, or may it only require
those who undertake it to compensate individuals whose rights
are thereby violated 2 ° If the latter, how does one set the proper
compensation level? Ideally, the state should replicate the market
price for the boundary crossing-that is, the price upon which the
persons threatened by the conduct and the person who wishes to
118

Nozick responds to this problem as follows: "To state the point exactly in order to
exclude such complications is not worth the effort it would require." Id at 85 n * (cited in
note 2). Perhaps Nozick means to agree that the blackmail agreement in such circumstances is not "unproductive." The further implication that such instances should be lawful would make this a profound concession, deeply inconsistent with prevailing law. More
probably, Nozick means that he could recraft his test for unproductive exchanges so as to
make the deal between Adulterer and Blackmail, Inc. unproductive by definition. But the
difficulty in justifying blackmail's criminalization would be exacerbated.
...
See Gorr, 58 Personalist at 187 (cited in note 116). See also Murphy, 63 Monist at
158 (cited in note 2) (observing that Nozick argues that "blackmail should be prohibited
because it is an unproductive economic exchange" and criticizing Nozick for failing to provide any argument for the proposition "that unproductive economic exchanges are immoral").
'"Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 57 (cited in note 2). In the vocabulary famously introduced by Professors Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, may the state
employ property or liability rules for the protection of rights? See Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972).
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engage in it would agree in a voluntary transaction. However, the
likely existence of a transactional surplus (where the minimum
price acceptable to the seller is less than the maximum price acceptable to the buyer) makes it impossible to ascertain the hypothetical market price. And it would be unfair to allow the boundary crosser to appropriate all the benefits of the exchange by
compensating the "seller" of the right in an amount (less than the
market price) necessary to keep him on the same indifference
curve. The impossibility of identifying a fair compensation price
without ex ante bargaining between the parties is, for Nozick, one
argument for allowing the state to prohibit conduct that would
cause or risk a boundary crossing.'21 However, Nozick continues,
when the state does prohibit conduct that risks crossing the
moral boundary of another, it should usually compensate the
party whose liberty is thus infinged.' 2 Again the question arises
of how much to pay. Just enough, Nozick answers, to keep him on
the same indifference curve he would occupy were he not disadvantaged by the prohibition.' In this case, that is, the state may
appropriate the entire transactional surplus. Why? Because the
exchange is "unproductive."
For present purposes, whether the foregoing argument is cogent is unimportant. What is important is that the productive exchange test is only a tool for determining how much compensation is due an individual whose risky conduct the state prohibits.
Whether the state is justified in prohibiting particular conduct is
a wholly separate question. 24 In short, not only is the productive
exchange test an implausible basis for making blackmail criminal, but Nozick should no longer be read to contend otherwise.
This is not to claim, though, that he has nothing to say about
blackmairs criminalization. But we must look elsewhere to find
it.
The definition of an unproductive exchange Nozick offers in
Anarchy, State, and Utopia closely tracks the test of coercion that

he offered some years earlier when he argued (roughly) that a
proposal is coercive if it is properly deemed a "threat" rather than
an "offer.""2 A proposal is a threat if it makes the recipient worse

" Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopiaat 63-65 (cited in note 2).
..Id at 78-85.
"'Id at 86-87. For preliminary remarks regarding Nozick's notion of "disadvantage,"
see id at 82-83.
"See id at 67 n
"'Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton
White, eds, Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel 440, 447
(St. Martin's 1969).
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off relative to his expected baseline, where "[t]he term 'expected'
is meant to shift between or straddle predicted and morally required."" Insofar as we are seeking a justification for criminal-

izing blackmail, this approach seems more promising.'27 Although
the relationship between freedom and coercion may not be easy to
articulate with precision," the two concepts plainly stand in
rough opposition: generally, one who is coerced is at least to that
extent unfree. Therefore, for one who values human freedom (as
Nozick does), coercion is prima facie wrongful. 9 So if a blackmail
proposal is coercive, there is good reason to believe that it should
be made illegal. 3 °
On inspection, though, Nozick's "coercion" thesis proves no
more satisfactory than the "unproductive exchange" rationale at

solving blackmail's paradox. First, it is unclear whether most
'MId.
'In most cases, the tests for coercion and unproductive exchange come out the same.
That is, a consummated exchange is "unproductive" if and only if the proposal that
launched the exchange was a "threat." Such is the case, for example, with the illustration
Nozick offers to elucidate the second criterion of an unproductive exchange:
Ifyour next-door neighbor plans to erect a certain structure on his land, which he has
a right to do, you might be better off if he didn't exist at all.... Yet purchasing his
abstention from proceeding with his plans will be a productive exchange. Suppose,
however, that the neighbor has no desire to erect the structure on the land; he formulates his plan and informs you of it solely in order to sell you his abstention from
it. Such an exchange would not be a productive one; it merely gives you relief from
something that would not threaten if not for the possibility of an exchange to get relief from it.
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 84-85 (cited in note 2). As Nozick's last sentence
suggests, the proposal leading up to the hypothesized unproductive exchange is a threatbecause it is coercive-not an offer.
But the equivalence between coercion and unproductive exchanges does not always
hold. Imagine that your coworker announces that his daughter is selling Girl Scout cookies and that he will be taking orders. You subscribe for four boxes of Thin Mints at $2.50
per box. Although you'd prefer the $10 to the cookies, you estimate that to decline the offer
might cause you some reputational harm, and you value the cookies and the preservation
of your reputation more highly than $10 plus a possible slight diminution of your office
status. This is plainly an unproductive exchange-you would have preferred that your coworker had never mentioned his daughter and the cookies. But the offer to sell you Girl
Scout cookies is not a threat (because it doesn't put you worse off than your expected or
morally deserved baselines).
See, for example, Nozick, Coercionat 440 (cited in note 125).
See Altman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1641 (cited in note 43).
'Note that Nozick's shift from viewing blackmail as unproductive (bad consequences)
to viewing it as coercive (wrongful) justifies placing him in Section I.B rather than with
the consequentialists in IAL Not surprisingly, Nozick's excursus on 'unproductive exchanges" has caused other commentators difficulty in characterizing his position on
blackmail. See Gordon, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1758, 1772 n 137 (cited in note 1) (wondering
whether Nozicks blackmail argument is deontological or consequentialist); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413, 1447 n 140, 1449 n 145
(1989) (noting both that Nozick has "used utilitarian grounds to defend the ban on blackmail" and that his theory "reflects conceptions of negative liberty").
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blackmail proposals count as threats under Nozick's definition.
As noted, the "expected baseline" upon which Nozick's theory depends is a function of empirical and moral components. Nozick
proposes that the normal and morally required course of events
usually coincide and, further, that when they do not, the latter
ordinarily takes precedence over the former.' 3 ' This being the
case, it becomes essential to know whether the "victim" of the
garden variety blackmail proposal has a moral right to nondisclosure. Rights and duties being correlative,'32 the question, in other
words, is whether the blackmailer has a moral duty to remain silent. 1' 3 As we have seen, this is a tricky question. Nozick's analysis provides no answer.
Worse, no simple categorical answer can resolve the puzzle.
If the answer is no--the blackmailer does not have a moral duty
to remain silent-then blackmail is not coercive and Nozick
leaves us no basis for prohibiting it. If the answer is yes, then, if
Nozick has succeeded in justifying making blackmail criminal, he
has done so only by advancing effectively the same solution as
has Feinberg: if a blackmail proposal is coercive only because the
act "threatened" is wrongful, then the propriety of criminalizing
blackmail turns entirely on the morality of the act threatened.
And this resolution of the puzzle raises the question why unconditional performance of the acts leveraged into blackmail proposals should remain lawful. After all, other instances of criminal coercion represent threats to perform illegal acts; just as the law
prohibits the gunman from coercing his victim ("your money or
your life"), so too does it forbid his shooting the victim without
even having voiced a threat. In short, if Nozick's proposed solution (blackmail is criminal because it is coercive) is correct, it
merely reformulates the puzzle-why should it be a legal right to
perform what it is illegal to threaten?-without resolving it.
C. Summary
The failure of the theories assessed in Section I. suggests
that we cannot explain and justify blackmail's criminalization by
131

Nozick, Coercion at 449-51 (cited in note 125).
at least. For an argued qualification (that does not undermine the point
in the body), see David Lyons, The Correlativityof Rights andDuties, 4 Nous 45 (1970).
1"As Kathleen Sullivan has concluded, "coercion . . . is inevitably normative, not
merely descriptive, empirical, or psychological. It necessarily embodies a conclusion about
the wrongfulness of a proposal, not merely the degree of constraint it imposes on choice."
Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1443 (cited in note 130). See also id at 1448-50 & n 142 (discussing the normative judgments underlying Nozick's and others' definitions of the baseline from which coercive proposals are measured).
1

"Ordinarily,
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attending only to its supposed social consequences. Any satisfactory resolution of the blackmail puzzle must acknowledge and explain the moral wrongfulness of the blackmail threat. The failure
of the theories assessed in Section I.B demonstrates: first, that
there is a moral difference between blackmail and the unconditional performance of the act threatened or offered (that is, we
cannot establish the moral character of a blackmail proposal simply by first determining the moral status of the act upon which
the blackmail is predicated); and second, that one cannot explain
this moral difference by treating the conditional threat or offer as
a morally aggravating factor. One should thus question the
dominant assumption of this latter group of theories-that we already know that the conditional blackmail proposition is morally
worse than unconditional performance of the act threatened, and
that it remains only to explain why. Section IE is animated by the
suspicion that blackmail remains puzzling because we have yet to
understand how the threat and the act differ.

II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Those inclined toward two-part categorization could propose
numerous ways to divide the universe of blackmail theories. As
we have seen, the well-rehearsed distinction between deontological and consequentialist moral theory suggests a division between
those scholars who urge that blackmail is criminal because it is
wrong in itself and those who focus on the its allegedly adverse
social consequences. Alternatively, it could be revealing to distinguish contributions based on the particular question they appear
devised to answer. Most theorists view the blackmail puzzle principally as a challenge to understand why this conditional threat
to perform a legal act is different from all other threats to perform legal acts; others propose to explain how this voluntary
transaction differs from other voluntary transactions. Yet a third
possible classification would track the familiar distinction between bottom-up and top-down modes of analysis. Whereas some
writers attempt first to understand blackmail as a social phenomenon and only then to explain why some purportedly peculiar
feature of the practice makes it a fit subject for the criminal law,
others start with an explicit theoretical model of the criminal law
and then seek to locate blackmail within the model.
This Section proceeds in the latter mode. Section II.A enumerates three independent conditions that might constitute at
least prima facie justification for criminalizing particular conduct. Section l.B demonstrates that one of these three criteria
justifies criminal zing "central case" blackmail-defined as a
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blackmailer's threat to disclose embarrassing information about
his victim unless the victim pays him a specified sum. This demonstration constitutes what I have called the evidentiary theory.
Section H.C summarizes the evidentiary theory and answers
blackmails two principal puzzles. It explains why blackmail is an
exception to two general rules: that it should be legal to threaten
what it is legal to do, and that voluntary transactions should be
lawful.
A. Criteria of Criminali ation
If we are to determine, in other than ad hoc fashion, whether
it is justifiable to make blackmail criminal, we will first need
standards or rules detailing when society may legitimately
threaten criminal punishment. This Section sets forth three criteria that independently might explain and justify when society
may criminalize given conduct. It then elaborates upon the onethe notion that a liberal society may criminalize morally blameworthy, harm-causing conduct-that provides the strongest basis
for making blackmail criminal.
1.

General justifying aims.

If a criterion of criminalization is not to be freestanding and
arbitrary, it should rest on an understanding of what H.L.A. Hart
termed the "general justifying aim" of the institution of punishment."M By common consensus, there are two justifying aims." 5 A
consequentialist theory justifies punishment as a means to reduce socially undesirable behavior through such mechanisms as
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 3 ' A retributivist
theory, in contrast, justifies punishment on deontological grounds
by the inherent rightness of inflicting retribution upon a wrongdoer.3 7 A point commonly overlooked is that a consequentialist
" H.L.A. Hart, Punishmentand Responsibility 8-11 (Oxford 1968).
"See, for example, id at 8-13; Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in Sanford H. Kadish,
ed, 4 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1336, 1336-38 (Macmillan 1983); George P.
Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw 414-20 (Little, Brown 1978); Herbert L. Packer, The
Limits of the Criminal Sanction' 35-61 (Stanford 1968); John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 Phil Rev 3, 4-5 (1955).
"Most contemporary theorists espouse a consequentialist justifying aim. For a classic
elaboration and defense, see Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction at 39-61 (cited in
note 135).
"The most prominent contemporary advocate of this position is Professor Michael
Moore. See, for example, Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution,in Ferdinand
Schoeman, ed, Responsibility, Character,and the Emotions (Cambridge 1987). Unfortunately, the common formulation of retributivism as the theory that "[wie are justified in
punishing because and only because offenders deserve it," id at 181, speaks only to the
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justifying aim can itself be the product of either of two radically
opposed ethical theories, depending upon what content is ascribed to the notion of "socially undesirable behavior." If the behavior sought to be reduced is deemed undesirable because it is
thought to effect a net diminution in social welfare, then the justification is, at root, utilitarian. But it is a mistake to assert that
the nonretributive justifying aim of punishment is inherently
"utilitarian in nature."3 ' One who justifies the institution of
criminal punishment on consequentialist rather than retributive
grounds might be seeking to prevent acts believed to be wrong in
themselves. 3 0 In this way, one could, as a matter of politicaltheory, consistently defend punishment for consequentialist reasons
as serving a deontologic moral theory. 40
2.

Three criteria of criminalization.

The foregoing brief review suggests three principal factors
that, depending upon the particular justifying aim of punishment
adopted, would be especially relevant in determining whether

justification for imposing punishment in any given case, not to the justification for the institution of punishment. See also id at 181 n 1 (adopting a conception of "moral culpability" that "does not presuppose that the act done is morally bad, only that it is legally prohibited"). As a justification for creating a system of criminal laws backed by threat of
punishment, the notion that persons who break those laws deserve to be punished would
be circular. Nonetheless, belief in the intrinsic moral worth-or perhaps duty, see id at
182-of punishing individuals for "morally bad" actions plainly implies a retributivist justification for criminalization as well as for punishment. Indeed, Moore himself conceives of
retributivism as both a general justifying aim of criminal punishment and a justification
for its imposition in a given case. See, for example, Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 Israel L Rev 15, 16-17 (1993).
"uSee, for example, Richard J. Bonnie, et al, eds, CriminalLaw 2 (Foundation 1997)
(describing the view that "punishment is threatened and imposed in order to achieve beneficial social consequences" as "utilitarian in nature").
'This was St. Thomas Aquinas's justification for the institution of human, as distinct
from divine, law. Since some persons
are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was
necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least,
they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which
compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q 95, Art 1. Therefore, insofar as we speak
of only two general justifying aims, it seems preferable to term them "consequentialist"
and "retributive," see Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw at 415 (cited in note 135), saving
the utilitarian label for one of the two broad species of consequentialist theories.
"°This position might be internally inconsistent if one holds a strong Kantian belief
that there is no moral value in performing the right action for fear of punishment. See
Immanuel Kant, Groundingfor the Metaphysics of Morals 399-401 (Hackett 1993) (originally published in 1785). But this is not a necessary view.
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particular conduct' should be made criminal: (1) whether the
conduct is utility reducing; (2) whether the conduct is wrongful in
itself; and (3) whether commission of the conduct is morally
blameworthy. This is not to say, though, that the presence of any
one of the these factors alone permits a liberal society to impose
criminal sanctions. As we have seen, a consistent utilitarian theory must account for the costs of trying to prohibit undesirable
conduct. Also, a rule that would authorize criminal punishment
for any wrongful or blameworthy conduct would prove unbearably
intrusive. It seems necessary, therefore, to qualify the second and
third factors with some form of harm principle in order to limit
their reach.
These qualifications lead to three independent prima facie
criteria for when a liberal society may employ the criminal lawcriteria that should appear as fairly obvious (if not logically necessary) derivations from the standard proposed justifying aims.
Conduct may be made criminal if.
(1) it is likely in the aggregate to yield net adverse social consequences (taking into account the costs imposed by the criminal
ban itself);
(2) it (a) tends to cause or threaten identifiable harm and (b)
is morally wrongful in itself; or
(3) it tends both (a) to cause or threaten identifiable harm,
and (b) to be undertaken by a morally blameworthy actor.
These three criteria are not identical. Although much conduct (consider the mala in se offenses of the common law) will
satisfy all three, each justifies some use of the criminal law that
the others cannot. The practical differences between the second
and third criteria, on the one hand, and the first on the other,
should be apparent: for purposes of the first criterion, it is irrelevant whether the conduct that is a candidate for being made
criminal is wrongful on deontologic grounds or is ordinarily
blameworthy in the absence of a criminal prohibition.' And al'"'Conduct" here and throughout should be understood broadly to connote any describable combination of action, attendant circumstances, results, and mental states.
"After conduct is criminalized in accordance with condition (1), commission of the
proscribed conduct is ordinarily morally blameworthy insofar as it reflects the knowing
violation of a valid criminal law. See, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp Prob 401, 416 (1958) ("[I]f the actor knowingly goes
counter to a valid legislative determination that the risk he is taking is excessive, even
though he himself does not believe it to be, there is an independent basis for moral condemnation in this deliberate defiance of law.). For this reason, a consequentialist general
justifying aim can coexist with the retributive principle of distribution, which requires
that punishment only be meted out to the morally guilty. See H.LA. Hart, Punishment
and Responsibility at 9 (cited in note 134). See also Rawls, 64 Phil Rev at 4-13 (cited in
note 135); S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems ofPunishment, 33 Phil 325 (1958).
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though the second and third criteria demand some harm, neither
requires that the expected harm outweigh expected benefits. The
distinction between the second and third criteria turns on the
claim that an actor is not blameworthy for engaging in a wrongful
action if, for example, he lacks information critical to determining
its wrongfulness or acts out of a bona fide and reasonable judgment (albeit one a majority of society deems mistaken) that his
act is morally justified. For example, a legislator who concludes
that euthanasia is morally wrong but also believes that, in practice, the euthanizer rarely acts in a morally blameworthy fashion
could vote to criminalize the conduct in accord with the second
criterion but not the third. Conversely, an actor who causes harm
for reasons that are not justified is deserving of blame regardless
of whether the act is deemed wrongful in itself. To use a familiar
example, if someone kills an assailant in a situation where the
use of deadly force is justified because necessary for self-defense,
but the killer is unaware of the necessity, the killing is justifiably
made criminal under the third criterion but not the second.'
3.

The third criterion: defining terms.

Provisionally accepting the foregoing criteria invites the
question whether blackmail (however defined) satisfies any of
them. My criticisms of the theories canvassed in Section I suggest
that blackmail is not likely to satisfy either the first or the second. It is unclear, once one takes account of the costs imposed by
the criminal ban itself, whether any substantial category of
blackmail yields net adverse social consequences; and it seems
extremely likely that a large subset of presently criminali.ed
conduct-adventitious blackmail--does not. Also, efforts to explain why the blackmail act is wrongful appear unable to answer
the questions of whether and why the act threatened is likewise
wrongful. Consequently, this Section endeavors to show that
blackmail is properly criminal because it satisfies the third criterion. A successful demonstration will both explain why blackmail
is criminal and amount to a conditional justification-conditioned, that is, on the validity of the claim that it is permissible
for the state to criminalize conduct because it is morally blameworthy and harm-causing.'" Because the argument to follow will
'"For an interesting debate over this issue, compare Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of
Justification:Societal Harm as a Prerequisitefor CriminalLiability, 23 UCLA L Rev 266
(1975), with George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr.
Robinson, 23 UCLA L Rev 293 (1975).
'"Because this solution to the blackmail puzzle will rest on the third criterion, we
need not at this time expressly affirm either a retributivist or consequentialist general
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necessarily depend on the particular content ascribed to "harm"
and "moral blameworthiness," some explication of these notoriously ambiguous terms is in order.
In legal, as in common, parlance, "harm"can connote injury
to an almost limitless variety of interests. A cursory review of
existing crimes indicates that the law does recognize as "harm"
injuries to, among other things, bodily integrity (homicide, rape,
battery), psychic or emotional well-being (assault, stalking, hate
speech, child pornography), property interests (theft, vandalism,
trespass), public institutions and processes (treason, bribery of
public officials, insider trading), and public morals (prostitution,
obscenity, drug use, gambling). The important question, however,
is normative: what types of harms may a liberal society rely on to
justify limiting individual liberty?45 This is an extraordinarily
challenging question, raising issues of kind and degree that have
bedeviled some of our most prominent theorists of the criminal
law."4 If a thoroughly developed, foundational answer to this
question were necessary in order to resolve the blackmail puzzle,
we would be in for a long digression indeed. Happily, such an account is not needed. As we will see, my contention that blackmail
satisfies the harm requirement fits well within the existing legal
landscape and is unlikely, I think, to strain our intuitions. For
justifying aim. The retributivist foundations of the third criterion should be self-evident.

But I assume that (with one caveat noted below) the third criterion could also be comfortably grounded in a sufficiently expansive consequentialism-one that focuses not
solely on the consequences of the conduct at issue, but also on, for example, the potential
harm to the "social fabric" caused by failure to punish those who engage in such conduct,
and the concrete future harms that might be averted by incapacitating and specially deterring one who has exhibited a potential predisposition to cause harm. Indeed, reasons
such as these have fueled long-running suspicion that most self-proclaimed justifying-aim
retributivists are really disguised consequentialists. See, for example, Gregg v Georgia,
428 US 153, 237-41 (1976) (Marshall dissenting); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 9 (cited in note 134). For an extended recent argument that society can best serve
utilitarian aims by structuring all punishment decisions in accord with the community's
moral judgments of desert, see Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453 (1997).
The caveat: insofar as the third criterion rests on retributivist premises, we must be
concerned with actual moral blameworthiness; insofar as it rests on a consequentialist interest in constructing a shared moral universe, it is the perception of moral blameworthiness that matters.
'"See Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries," and
Article III, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 188-91 (1992) (criticizing the notion that the shifting focus
in standing jurisprudence from "legal injury" to "injury in face effected a change from a
question of law to a question of fact, and observing that "the real question is what harms
that people perceive as such ought to be judicially cognizable).
'"The most thorough exploration of this question is found in Professor Feinberg's distinguished four volume work collectively titled The Moral Limits of the CriminalLaw. See
Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford 1984); Offense to Others (Oxford 1985); Harm to
Self(Oxford 1986); Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford 1988).
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present purposes, then, it should be sufficient to observe that
whether a claimed injury counts as a "harm" with which the
criminal law will be concerned "is a product of legal conventions
and nothing else." 47
"Moral blameworthiness" is also a nebulous concept. Although all the factors of which it is a function cannot be fully elucidated in this space, a few guideposts can be marked. In the
easiest: case, an individual's conduct is morally blameworthy
when his objective is to inflict harm-such as when he acts out of
malice (in the lay sense) or spite. But this does not exhaust the
subject. The average thief, after all, steals not in order to impose
a loss on his victim, but for the purpose of obtaining a gain for
himself. Yet this conduct, too, appears blameworthy-even absent a law prohibiting it. 4 ' The category of "morally blameworthy" conduct, therefore, must be broad enough to include the conscious willingness to cause harm without adequate moral justification, where the amount and quality of justification required is
commensurate with the magnitude of harm caused. Similarly, it
should include the conscious willingness to risk harm to others
without adequate moral justification. (Consider drag racers on
public roads.) Lastly, an actor is morally blameworthy when his
conduct reflects an unjustifiable failure to appreciate the risks he
creates. Putting aside questions concerning the moral blameworthiness of negligent harm-causing conduct (which the blackmail puzzle does not implicate), we can articulate moral blameworthiness in terms of the actor's motivations for acting. Thus (as
a first and rough pass), an actor has "morally bad motives" 5 ' and is therefore morally blameworthy' 5 --when he acts with the
knowledge that his conduct will cause, threaten, or risk harm to
others, unless: (1) he actuallybelieves that his action will produce
'4 Sunstein, 91 Mich L Rev at 190 (cited in note 145) (discussing the "actual injury" requirement in standing doctrine).
"See note 142.
"'See Model Penal Code § 2.02 (ALI1962) (defining culpability levels).
'"Inethics, "wrongfil" is sometimes limited to acts, whereas "bad" is applied to an actors motives in performing an act. See, for example, William K. Frankena, Ethics 8-9
(Prentice-Hall 1963); Jerome Hall, GeneralPrinciplesof CriminalLaw 141 (Bobbs-Merrill
1947). Following this usage, this Article speaks generally of "wrongful acts7 and "bad motives." A "bad act" is one that is badly motivated, whether or not it is wrongful.
"'Arguably, an actor may have blameworthy motives without being morally blameworthy himself, if he lacks moral agency. Because the law presupposes that people are
moral agents, this qualification does not bear upon whether to make particular conduct
criminal. For an argument that it should be afforded greater relevance at the punishment
stage than present law allows, see Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless:Reassessingthe Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L Rev 1511
(1992).
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more good than evil; (2) that belief is a but-for cause of his action;
and (3) the standards the actor employs for measuring and
evaluating "evil" and "good" in this case are defensible under
common moral standards.
B. Criminalizing Blackmail: Of Harm and Bad Motive
With these preliminaries out of the way, we have reached the
critical questions: (a) does blackmail (ordinarily) cause cognizable
harm? 2and (b) does the blackmailer (ordinarily) harbor bad mo15
tives?
1.

A direct approach.

To some readers, "yes" is the obvious answer to both of these
questions. Professor Wendy Gordon has opined that "the deontologic case against blackmail seems clear. One person deliberately seeks to harm another to serve her own ends-to exact
money or other advantage-and does so in a context where she
has no conceivable justification for her act."1" The task, though,
is to explain how we know the blackmailer seeks to cause harm
without adequate justification.
Professor Gordon offers a thoughtful and elaborate explanation, but not, I think, one that ultimately persuades. Inverting
the familiar doctrine of double effect,"M Gordon proposes to demonstrate the wrongfulness of a blackmailer's motives by relying
on her so-called doctrine of single effect, which holds that "when
one's direct intent is to do harm, beneficial side-effects have little
or no deontological significance." 5 ' Under this principle, Gordon
concludes,
the blackmailer violates deontological constraints if he
threatens disclosure in order to obtain money or other advantage because his intent is directed to the money, not to
"Regardless of whether the third criterion for criminalization rests on consequentialist or retributive justifications, see note 144, it cannot require that the conduct examined always cause (or threaten) harm and be undertaken with bad motives. Such a requirement would make ex ante line drawing impossible. Although one or another more
precise qualifiers might appear more apt on further scrutiny, "ordinarily" serves as a satisfactory placeholder-with the important qualification that it not be understood to require that harm or bad motives occur "more often than not." There is no a priori reason
why making certain conduct criminal must be improper when "only," say, 40 percent of
given conduct is undertaken with bad motives.
" Gordon, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1758 (cited in note 1).
'"The doctrine of double effect provides that it is "morally permissible to do an act
that has bad consequences if they are outweighed by the good, so long as the harms are
not directly intended." Id at 1763.
"Id at 1764-65.
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the [lawfulness of] the disclosure or beneficial side-effects that
might be produced. These latter factors are thus outside the
intent of the blackmailer in the same way the killing of civilians is outside the intent of the strategic bomber: if
blackmail's purported beneficial effects were eliminated or if
civilians were protected, the actors would go forward. Since
the blackmailer's end is harm, the act is not redeemable by
the possibility that some component of the means he uses
might be lawful or beneficial.'56
The greatest problem with this analysis is Gordon's assertion
that "the blackmailer's end is harm." What does this mean?
Surely not that his motive is to cause harm, for presumably the
average blackmailer's motive, like that of the garden variety
thief, is merely to obtain a personal benefit. Perhaps Gordon
means that blackmail is wrong only because the blackmailer has
no interest in benefitting his victim.'57 But so what? Without
more, Gordon seems merely to describe a narrow self-interest
most observers would already ascribe to the blackmailer even
without the benefit of her doctrine of single effect. Moreover, her
doctrine does not explain why the criminal law should care about
such self-interest.
Consequently, two questions remain. First, the question
Gordon addresses but does not adequately answer: in what way is
a blackmailer's motive bad? Second, a question Gordon overlooks:
how does the blackmailer's motive differ from that of the person
who discloses harmful information without first trying to sell his
silence? I propose to answer these questions by tackling the latter
one first, believing that we can best understand why blackmail is
criminalized by examining whether our third criterion of criminalization justifies criminalization of the unconditionaldisclosure
of information likely to be injurious to the reputation of another. 5 '
"I Id at 1765-66.
...
Gordon considers a "libertarian" objection:
[Ain ordinary buyer would be delighted to obtain goods without paying, and an ordinary seller would be delighted to obtain money without giving up goods. If so, the
parties to the commercial transaction have the "real" or direct intent of extracting
money or other advantage-just like the blackmailer.
Id at 1770. Not so, she counters, proposing that, as an empirical matter, most people value
reciprocity in exchange. "Take away the component of the buyer or seller's activity that
benefits others, and she will find the activity less attractive; if so, then under the DSE
test, part of the 'real' or direct intent is to exchange and not to extract." Id at 1771.
"'It will be apparent that we are entering through the first door-attacking the
blackmail puzzle by focusing on blackmail as an exception to the rule that it should be legal to threaten what it is legal to do, rather than as an exception to the rule that volun-
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Detour: criminalizing the unconditional disclosure.

The third criterion, recall, requires that the conduct tends
both to cause or threaten identifiable harm and to be undertaken
by a morally blameworthy actor. Plainly, the simple disclosure of
information likely to injure another's reputation satisfies the
harm requirement (at least when the claimed injury is of a sufficiently substantial degree as to warrant society's protection 5 ').
Injury to reputation is clearly other-regarding harm. Moreover, it
is a harm that has long been legally cognizable-civilly and
criminally-under both common and statutory law.1"o At this
stage of the inquiry, it is irrelevant whether the disclosure is true
or false; either can cause real harm. 6 It is likewise immaterial
whether disclosure causes greater aggregate benefit than aggregate harm, as may occur when an adulterer's infidelity is disclosed to the wronged spouse or when an embezzler's offenses are
disclosed to his business associates. A weighing of harms versus
benefits would be essential to an effort to criminalize the conduct
in accord with the first criterion articulated above, which requires
that the conduct yields net adverse social consequences. 62 But it
tary transactions should be legal. See introduction to Section II. In Gorr's estimation,
most theorists have .. tended to suppose that there is nothing especially problematic about the fact that we permit blackmailers to do what they threaten, and that all
that really needs explaining is how, in light of this, it could ever make sense to prohibit the threats themselves. My contention, however, is that this is precisely the
wrong way to view the matter and that the key to resolving the paradox of blackmail
(and to meeting some of the other important objections to its continued criminalization) is to determine just why blackmailers are given the liberty to do the acts that
they threaten.
Gorr, 21 Phil & Pub Aft at 44 (cited in note 83). Despite the rightness and importance of
this insight, Gorr's argument that a given act and its corresponding blackmail proposal
are morally equivalent fails for reasons already assayed. See notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
" Consistent with the maxim de minimis non curat lex, the mildly insulting or indiscreet tattle of everyday discourse does not count. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559
(1977) ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him.") (emphasis added).
"0See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323, 341-46 (1974). See also id at 341 (stating
that "the individual's right to the protection of his good name 'reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty'), quoting Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75, 92
(1966) (Stewart concurring).
.6See generally Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 72 (1964) (acknowledging general
"abhorrence that 'a man's forgotten misconduct, or the misconduct of a relation, in which
the public had no interest, should be wantonly raked up, and published to the world, on
the ground of its being true') (emphasis omitted), quoting Thomas Curson Hansard, ed,
69 ParliamentaryDebates 1230 (Hansard 3d series 1843) (remarks of Lord Campbell);
Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy§ 6.1 at 201 (Prentice Hall 1991 & Supp 1997).
" See Section IIA.2.
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has no bearing on the permissibility of using the third criterion
(or the second) to make reputation-threatening disclosures criminal. For purposes of the third criterion, to repeat, the "harm" condition requires only that the conduct at issue causes or threatens
identifiable harm, not that the aggregation of all possible harms
and benefits yields a net diminution of social welfare.
The second requirement of the third criterion, however-that
the disclosure of reputationally harmful information be ordinarily
undertaken with bad motives-is not satisfied. Doubtless some
disclosures are malicious or unjustified. But many others are
made with good motives-to protect a potential victim of a con
man or to provide presumably helpful and deserved information
to a benighted spouse, for example. It seems unlikely that the instances in which persons disclose reputationally harmful information with morally bad motives constitute a sufficiently large
subset of all reputationally harmful disclosures to warrant criminalization under the third criterion.'6
There is no reason, however, that an explicit description of
motivation cannot be imported into a definition of the conduct to
be criminali ed. This being so, conduct described as "the morally
blameworthy disclosure of information likely to harm the reputation of another" could be made criminal consistent with the third
criterion (where, if necessary to satisfy notice requirements,
"moral blameworthiness" is further defined consistent with my
earlier discussion). In fact, through the law of criminal libel,
many states have prohibited precisely that: by the time of the
Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Garrisonv Louisiana," a majority of states had constitutional or statutory provisions that
made truth a defense to a criminal libel prosecution only when
"published with good motives and for justifiable ends."" The Supreme Court's holding in Garrison that the First Amendment
prohibits states from prosecuting any but the knowing or reckless
falsehood when the alleged libel relates to public affairs has led to
judicial invalidation of several such statutes" and to desuetude
of many others. 67 But neither Garrisonnor the prospect that the
Court may expand it to prohibit criminal libel prosecutions for
" Keep in mind that most gossiping does not inflict cognizable harm. See note 159.
1379 US 64 (1964).
1

Id at 70-72 & n 7. Although criminal libel was generally justified as a means to protect against breaches of the peace, see id at 67-68, some jurisdictions had expressly conceived of the offense as a means to guard against injury to the libeled party. See, for example, GardnervArizona, 15 Ariz 403, 139 P 474, 476-77 (1914).
"See, for example, Montana v Helfrich, 277 Mont 452, 922 P2d 1159, 1161 (1996)
(citing cases).
'"'See, for example, Tollett v United States, 485 F2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir 1973).
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any maliciously defamatory statements absent proof of falsity" is
germane to the present inquiry, for First Amendment constraints
are external to the criminal law proper. As far as criminal theory
is concerned, the unconditional disclosure of harmful information,
without more, is not properly made criminal; the morally wrong-

ful disclosure is.
3.

Bad motive and the conditional threat.

This discussion offers one sufficient response to Gorr's suggestion that we need "to determine just why blackmailers are
given the liberty to do the acts that they threaten":169 the likelihood that such persons act with good motives seems too high to
justify a criminal ban. But it does not directly explain the criminalization of blackmail. In order to solve that puzzle we might
first examine how a state that criminalizes the disclosure of reputationally harmful information with malice or without justification might prove those factors in a given case.7 Because it is profoundly difficult to obtain direct evidence of an actor's mental
state, 7 ' this is a challenging task.
In theory, bad motivation might be provable in a variety of
manners. Admissions by the defendant himself in conversation or
private writings would be the best evidence. In certain circumstances, perhaps, the state might be able to rely on the fact that
the defendant made the disclosure anonymously.7 2 How about
evidence that the accused had offered to remain silent for a fee

"The GarrisonCourt explicitly left this question open. See 379 US at 72 n 8. A decade
later, the Court again refused to decide "whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Cox BroadcastingCorp v Cohn, 420 US 469, 491 (1975).
"See note 158.
"'Many criminal libel statutes, following the common law, mitigated this problem by
making good motive and justification affirmative defenses. See Garrison,379 US at 70 n 7
(cataloguing state provisions). But a simple allocation of the burdens of production or persuasion (or both) to the defendant cannot eliminate all difficulty because the state must be
prepared to introduce evidence of bad motive if the defendant invokes the defense. Furthermore, in criminal slander prosecutions the state often has the burden of proving bad
motive. See, for example, California v Faber, 29 Cal App 2d Supp 751, 77 P2d 921, 923
(1938).
.See Kimberlin v Quinlan, 6 F3d 789, 809 & n 11 (DC Cir 1993) (Edwards dissenting), vacated and remanded, 515 US 321 (1995); Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L
Rev at 1864 (cited in note 2).
"See Pennsylvania v Foley, 292 Pa 277, 141 A 50, 51-52 (1928) (affirming conviction
under statute prohibiting "the sending of anonymous communications of a ... defamatory
. ;. nature," and explaining that anonymous publications of defamatory material "show
such a malignity of heart and a desire to do personal injury that the Legislature or the
courts may properly hold that such publications are so far malicious or negligent as to be
unjustifiable").
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prior to making the disclosure? Does this tend to show the requisite blameworthiness?
Surely it is probative. Consider, for example, a criminal libel
prosecution (in a jurisdiction where blackmail is legal) involving
defendants (D's) disclosure of a husband's (H's) infidelities to his
wife (W). Here, D's prior (unaccepted) offer to refrain, for a payment of $1,000, from disclosing the adultery is circumstantial
evidence that, when he proceeded to reveal H's secrets, D was not
motivated by loyalty to W, or by an interest in achieving some
measure of corrective justice, or by devotion to The Truth. A reasonable factfinder could suspect that, had any of these interests
motivated D, he would not have offered to sell H his silence. This
is not just a covert way of giving effect to the factfinder's own
ethical belief that D should not have offered to remain silent for
individual gain. It is empirically true that people value goods and
interests in diverse and incommensurable ways and, relatedly,
that most people have internalized a norm against commodifying
certain types of nonmaterial interests and obligations.1

3
1

It is

therefore reasonable to assume that most people who recognize
morally persuasive grounds for undertaking a given course of action would not offer to sell abstention from it for personal gain.1 4
At the same time, assuming a relative infrequency of unbridled
malice, many people who make a given disclosure with morally
blameworthy motives would refrain from making the disclosure if
paid off.' 5 For these two reasons, the probability that a morally
bad disclosure of adultery occurred after the discloser had offered
to remain silent for a fee is greater than the probability that a
morally good adultery disclosure occurred subsequent to such an
offer. It follows that a prior conditional offer of silence is probative evidence that, in revealing H's infidelity to W, the defendant
acted with the morally bad motives necessary to make his action
"For a thoughtful elaboration of these claims, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuationin Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 782-812 (1994).
"This is an empirical claim. Whether society should employ the criminal law for purposes of reinforcing or even prescribing norms of value incommensurability is a decidedly
separate question. See id at 790-93. Precisely because so many people already do act in
ways reflective of value incommensurability and resistant to wholesale commodification, it
is a question we need not resolve in order to explain blackmail's criminalization. In other
words, we are still proceeding in accordance with the third proposed criterion of criminalization, not the second.
"1Recall that morally bad motives are not limited to circumstances in which the actor'spurpose is to harm H, but include cases in which he acts with knowledge of harm to H
without actually harboring motives that would amount to adequate moral justification.
Very possibly, D did not reveal the harmful information for the purpose of injuring H. D
may have acted merely to avoid the loss of reputation he felt he would suffer by failing to
carry out his threat.
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(taken with knowledge of the harm it would cause) morally
blameworthy. 76
That the conditional threat is probative evidence making it
more likely that the particular disclosure of adultery was morally
blameworthy is important, but it is not yet what we need to
know. The critical question is: how likely? Although it would be
foolish to hope for much precision here, straightforward application of probability theory might allow us to hazard a very rough
estimate. As Bayes's Rule teaches, the odds that the post-threat
disclosure is morally blameworthy are the product of the odds
that any given disclosure of adultery is morally blameworthy and
the evidential value, or probative weight, of the conditional offer.177 For the reasons just discussed, the offer's probative weight
is likely to be fairly high. That is, the conditional threat probably
makes'it significantly more likely that the disclosure was morally
blameworthy. Absent any reason to suspect that only an insignificantly small percentage of all disclosures of adultery are badly
motivated, it seems fair to conclude that it is "ordinarily"17s the
after a conditional
case that the disclosure of adultery occurring
179
offer of silence is morally blameworthy.
..To be sure, that the offer is probative, all things being equal, does not mean it establishes the proposition that D lacked morally good motives when engaging in the disclosure. The assumed empirical fact that there exist individuals who would be motivated by
morally permissible reasons were they to expose an adulterer and'nonetheless would be
willing to remain silent for payment entails that the evidentiary inference cannot be ironclad. Indeed, we can well imagine cases in which it is quite plausible that the defendant
lacked bad motives when exposing H's infidelity. For example, D might tell a compelling
story of both his friendship with W and a pressing need for funds (say, Y's child needs an
emergency operation) arising in sudden coincidence with his discovery of Ms adultery.
Lacking any other source of income, D decides, after painful soul-searching, to blackmail
H to obtain the desperately needed funds. When H rejects D's offer, D proceeds to spill the
beans to W, believing as he had all along that W had a strong moral claim to the information, and even feeling somewhat relieved to be "freed" to perform his moral duty. In this
scenario-and by hypothesis only!-D lacks bad motives when engaging in his harmcausing disclosure, notwithstanding his unsuccessful blackmail proposal. But this conclusion has no bearing on the pivotal question of whether a reasonable factfinder would view
the unsuccessful blackmail threat as making it more likely that D possessed bad motives.
We are speaking of inferringbad motives, not deducing them, and the strength of the inference depends, here as elsewhere, upon the totality of circumstances. After all, if"[1]ife is
the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises," Samuel Butler, The
Note-Books of Samuel Butler 11 (Mitchell Kennerly 1913) (Henry Festing Jones, ed), no
less is the criminal law.
"Bayes's Rule provides that the posterior odds are equal to the prior odds times the
likelihood ratio. For a particularly lucid introduction to Bayesian probability, see Bernard
Robertson and GA Vignaux, InterpretingEvidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the
Courtroom ch 2 (Wiley 1995).
"'See note 152.
"'This conclusion can be supported with an example based on conservative assumptions consistent with the foregoing discussion. Where P(B 10) = the probability that a disclosure is morally bad given a prior conditional offer, P(G 10) = the probability that a dis-
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Insofar as these assumptions hold true more generally, a
state could, consistent with the third criterion of criminalization,
make it a crime intentionally to disclose information harmful to
the reputation of another after having first offered to remain silent for a fee.s ° Because it is ordinarily, and uncontroversially,
illegal to threaten what it is illegal to do, the state could also
make it a crime to threaten to disclose information harmful to another after first having offered to remain silent only if paid. That,
of course, is blackmail.''
Having reached blackmail in this roundabout manner, we
are positioned to offer a conceptual definition of the offense:8 2
closure is morally good given a prior conditional offer, P(O IB) = the probability of a prior
conditional offer given that the disclosure was made with morally bad motives, and
P(O IG) = the probability of a prior conditional offer given a disclosure made with morally
good motives, Bayes's Rule provides as follows:
[P(B IO) / P(GI O)] = [P(B) / P(G)] * [P(O IB) / P(O I G)]
(1)
Assume now that the background probability that a disclosure of adultery is made
with bad motives is .2, that the probability that a disclosure made with good motives was
made after a conditional offer of silence is .1, and that the probability that a disclosure
made with bad motives was made after a conditional offer of silence is .6. On these (concededly unverifiable) assumptions, the probability that an adultery disclosure made after
a conditional offer of silence is morally blameworthy can be determined as follows:
[P(B 1O)/ P(GI O)]= (.2/.8) * (.6 /.1)
(2)
[P(B 10) / P(G IO) = 1.5
(3)
(4)
P(B 10O) = 1.5 * (1 - P(B 10O))
P(B 10) = .6
(5)
Whatever the "actual" numbers might be (in some contrivedly empirical sense), social
actors are likely to suspect that this figure is quite high, for the modem mind's strong
preference for univocal, linear narrative is antagonistic to the psychologically more complex tales (as in note 176) that throw the evidentiary inference into question. See Richard
K. Sherwin, Law Frames:Historical Truth and NarrativeNecessity in a Criminal Case, 47
Stan L Rev 39, 40 (1994). And insofar as we might prefer to grouiid the third criterion of
criminalization in a consequentialist (rather than retributivist) general justifying aim concerned with social reinforcement of moral norms, it is the perception, not the reality, of the
incidence of morally blameworthy motives that matters. See note 144.
"'This is not to say that such conduct should be criminal. Each of the three criteria
provides only prima facie justification for criminalizing conduct; none demands it. A legislature could choose not to criminalize reputation-threatening disclosures undertaken
with morally bad motives if it concludes that such disclosures advance social welfare.
Moreover, other legal norms, including a constitutional guarantee, might mandate noncriminalization. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has already construed the First
Amendment to prohibit criminal punishment of true speech regarding matters of public
interest. See note 168.
1
..
It should make no difference whether the state chooses to enact the first offense.
Imagine that the state had criminalized both the act and the threat and then decided to
repeal the first for practical reasons (perhaps because it was deemed too vague, or too
likely to chill well-intentioned disclosures). There is no reason that it should have to repeal the second as well.
"In describing the definition as conceptual, I mean to emphasize that I do not intend
here to propose a legal definition. The definition in the text does not correlate perfectly
with blackmail as law and common parlance presently define it. More to the point, I do not
suggest that this definition should be codified. I take it that the first step when drafting a
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blackmail is a conditional threat by B to harm A under circumstances in which a reasonable factfinder could infer with confidence sufficient for purposes of criminalization that if B carried
out his threat he would be engaging in harm-causing conduct
with bad motives-specifically, that B would lack morally adequate reasons for knowingly causing harm-yet in which the
moral character of B's motives would have been opaque had he
acted without having made the threat. Put otherwise, blackmail
is a conditional threat to perform a legal but harmful act under
circumstances where the threat itself provides reason for making
the act criminal by suggesting that the actor would be inflicting
harm knowingly and without good motives."8
C.

Summary: Resolving the Puzzles
1.

The principal puzzle: why the act is legal and the
threat illegal.
The foregoing discussion and proposed definition should
make clear why the threat is illegal and the unconditional performance of the threatened act is not. As many theorists have
noted, there is a moral difference between the two. But, contrary
to prevailing opinion,"8 that difference is not that the threat is
somehow a morally aggravating factor. In the usual cases, merely
doing an act that has been leveraged into a blackmail proposal is
morally indeterminate in two senses-it is not clearly right or
wrong itself, and, all else being equal, it carries insufficient data
to support a secure inference about the moral character of the actor's motives. The threat, however, is presumptively undertaken
for bad motives. Insofar as we can explain why blackmail is
criminal only in accord with the third criterion of criminaliza-

criminal law is to identify, as closely as possible, the true contours of the conduct we wish

to proscribe. The set of legal rules consisting ofboth elements and defenses, crafted in response to that understanding, will inevitably be both over- and underinclusive in relation

to the underlying conduct that society would ideally want to deter and punish. In this
way, the legal definition will be a product of, but unlikely identical with, the conceptual
definition.
" It follows that, where practicable, the state should except from the blackmail ban
(through offense elements or affirmative defenses) conditional threats as to which the
likelihood of bad motives if undertaken can be expected, ex ante, to be particularly weak.
See Section III.
See, for example, Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1595 (cited in note 92) (concluding that
the blackmailer's "accommodation of the victim's preferences [by proposing, and agreeing,

to remain silent for a fee] aggravates rather than improves his moral position"); Altman,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1657 (cited in note 43).
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849

tion-which turns on the mental state and motivations of the actor-the blackmail threat has only evidentiary significance.'"
Professor Wesley Hohfeld's distinction between "operative"
and "evidential" facts provides a useful vehicle for understanding
this bedrock point. According to Hohfeld, "[o]perative, constitutive, causal, or 'dispositive' facts are those which... suffice to
change legal relations. "1 " In contrast, "[a]n evidential fact is one
which, on being ascertained, affords some logical basis-not conclusive-for inferring some other fact.... either a constitutive
fact or an intermediate evidential fact." 87 Plainly, the blackmailer's conditional threat is an operative fact under the existing
law of blackmail. Indeed, to ask why blackmail is a crime while
the act threatened is not is really only to inquire into why the
threat is an operative legal fact. Ordinarily, a fact is operative
under the criminal law because it has pre-legal constitutive or
causal significance. That the deceased was a human being is an
operative fact under the law of homicide, for example, because
something of independent importance turns on the fact that it
was a person (rather than, say, a chicken or a tomato plant) that
was killed. The evidentiary theory of blackmail recognizes that
the blackmail threat is not this type of operative fact. Fundamentally, the conditional threat is not "operative" at all, but evidential-it "affords some logical basis (not conclusive) for inferring
some other fact," namely, that the threatener had morally
blameworthy motives. In short, for purposes of explaining the
surprising conjunction that it is illegal to make a blackmail
threat while it is legal to engage in the conduct threatened, the
actor's bad motivation, not the threat itself, is properly viewed as
"operative."
Not only is the threat to disclose embarrassing information
not necessarily morally worse than the unconditional disclosure
of information absent the threat, but it may well be that a given
"MTo deny any categorical moral difference between wrongful disclosure of damaging
personal information about a person and blackmailing him over the same information is

not to assert that the criminal law need punish the behaviors with equal severity if the
state chooses to criminalize them beth. Deciding how much punishment to mete out for
particular offenses involves different considerations than does determining whether to
criminalize particular conduct. Although an exploration of the former question is well beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth observing that the two varieties of conduct differ
in potentially relevant ways. For example, Fletcher is surely right to emphasize that
blackmail is particularly harmful because it is usually a repeat affair (although his conclusion that blackmail is therefore a "paradigmatic" crime seems a non sequitur). Fletcher,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1626 (cited in note 96).
"Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 Yale L J 16, 25 (1913).
"IId at 27.
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discloser of information acts with even greater moral blameworthiness than does the ordinary blackmailer. Consider the case of
Charles Augustus Milverton, the master blackmailer concocted
by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle." Milverton's method
is as follows: He allows it to be known that he is prepared to
pay very high sums for letters which compromise people of
wealth and position.... Everything which is in the market
goes to Milverton, and there are hundreds in this great city
who turn white at his name. No one knows where his grip
may fall, for he is far too rich and cunning to work from hand
to mouth. He will hold a card back for years in order to play
it at ihe moment when the stake is best worth winning.18 9
Reasoning that one cannot "compare the ruffian who in hot blood
bludgeons his mate with this man, who methodically and at his
leisure tortures the soul and wrings the nerves in order to add to
his already swollen money-bags," Sherlock Holmes deems Milverton "the worst man in London."190
Maybe so, but Milverton could be worse still. Imagine that he
is as cunning and ruthless as Conan Doyle represents, but that
he is motivated by something other than money. Already rich as
Croesus, Milverton acquires information not to blackmail but
merely to reveal, for he takes greater pleasure in causing pain
and suffering than in aggregating further wealth. This Milverton
would never consider offering his victim a choice of harms; he will
disclose every bit of embarrassing and discrediting information
he obtains-at the moment most damaging to its subject. To be
sure, this Milverton is a less likely character than Conan Doyle's
because spite is a less common and less all-consuming motive
than avarice 9 ' (and because, unlike blackmail, the enterprise of
revealing information is not likely to be self-financing). But is
there any doubt that the "Master Fink--who "methodically and
at his leisure tortures the soul and wrings the nerves" in order to
torture the soul and wring the nerves-could more fairly lay
claim to the title "the worst man in London" than could the Master Blackmailer?

"See Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of CharlesAugustus Milverton, in 1 Sherlock Holmes: The Complete Novels and Stories 791 (Bantam 1986). Milverton is discussed
in Hepworth, Blackmail at 46-47 (cited in note 19).
"Doyle, Adventures of CharlesAugustus Milverton at 792.
GoId.
"' It is partially for this reason that the evidentiary inference is probative. See text accompanying notes 174-75.
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All this suggests that, First Amendment considerations
aside, the morally blameworthy disclosure of harmful information
could be made criminal. However, because the state would have
to prove that the defendant had a bad motive, successful prosecutions would be rare. At the same time, adoption of such a crime
would impose many costs-for example, it would waste resources
in failed prosecutions, chill the disclosure of socially useful facts,
and likely sow disrespect for the law. Moreover, when the state
did successfully prosecute, it would likely do so on the strength of
evidence that the defendant had first attempted to blackmail the
victim-in which event a prosecution for the crime of blackmail
would be available anyway. For all these reasons, a decision not
to enact such a law seems, at the least, prudent.
2.

The secondary puzzle: distinguishing other
voluntary transactions.

The answer to the second blackmail puzzle should be clear
now, too. The law and economics scholars have tended to suppose
that blackmail is a voluntary exchange between the blackmailer
and victim but have concluded that the practice is nonetheless
properly made criminal (at least in its paradigmatic form) because of the costs it imposes on other persons who are not parties
to the transaction (including society at large). 9 2 The evidentiary
theory demonstrates that this premise is mistaken. While not denying that blackmail might harm third parties, it insists that the
blackmail transaction is not voluntary in the first place.
As Professor Kathleen Sullivan has cogently explained, coercion "is inevitably normative ....It necessarily embodies a conclusion about the wrongfulness of a proposal."'93 Surely, then, if a
proposed course of action is wrong in itself, the conditional proposal is coercive (at least where the recipient of the proposal
views the proposed action as detrimental to her own interests).
But normative concerns are not limited to whether a proposal is
inherently wrongful in either an objective or conventional sense;
they extend as well to considerations of the moral character of an
actor's motives for advancing a proposal that is itself morally ambiguous. Although clarity may sometimes be enhanced by terming an immoral proposal "wrongful" and an immorally motivated
one "bad,""9 we should not insist on the distinction at all costs. To
the contrary, inasmuch as the conditional offer tends to reveal
note 12.
' Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1443 (cited in note 130).
'See note 150.
1See
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that the actor would lack morally adequate reasons for engaging
in his threatened course of conduct, a refusal to recognize this
particularproposal-made by this particular actor on this particular occasion-as "wrongful" beclouds more than it illuminates. Put otherwise, perhaps we should not rigidly insist that
the moral character of acts be judged independently of the motives behind them.'95 It follows that the blackmail victim is just as
coerced as the holdup victim. Because people's assumptions about
the intentions and motivations of others are central to the way
they experience social intercourse," victims of blackmail, just as
much as victims of holdups, are likely to view the threatener's
proposal as a "threat," not an "offer," and to experience themselves as acting under duress.'97 In neither case is the victim's acquiescence "voluntary" in a sense sufficiently robust to counsel
against societal interference with his purported transactional
autonomy.
III.

TESTING THE EVIDENTIARY THEORY: THE CENTRAL CASE

AND BEYOND

After demonstrating that the evidentiary theory explains
criminalization of a threat to expose an adulterer, the previous
Section moved quickly to contend that the theory generally supports criminalizing threats by B to reveal embarrassing information about A unless A pays B to remain silent. But this particular
conduct-which might be called "central case" blackmail-far
from exhausts the universe of potential blackmail. The act a
blackmailer threatens need not be to disclose information. The
blackmailer need not demand money. Furthermore, even central
case blackmail (as somewhat arbitrarily defined) encompasses
numerous subcategories that perhaps warrant further exploration. Should it matter, for example, if the information B threatens
to reveal is not merely embarrassing but relates to A's commis"See Steven Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 106 Ethics 327, 327 (1996) (setting
forth, and criticizing, the "very widely accepted and rarely questioned" proposition in
moral theory "that the motive of an action never determines whether it is right or wrong").
..See H.LA. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 182 (cited in note 134) (observing that "persons interpret each other's movements as manifestations of intention and
choices, and these subjective factors are often more important to their social relations
than the movements by which they are manifested or their effects').
"Put otherwise, theorists who deny that blackmail is coercive or that the blackmail
victim acts under duress fail to understand or validate the victim's perspective as participant in a particular human drama. Were she to articulate her sense of being coerced, the
victim would be more likely to emphasize the particular complaint that her blackmailer
ought not to do as he threatens, not the more abstract objection that what the blackmailer
threatens ought not be done.

1998]

Taking Motives Seriously

sion of a crime? Or what if B "demands" of A no more than B
could get from other market actors for the same information?
Questions like these have occupied, and at times confounded,
blackmail theorists. Accordingly, any adequate theory of blackmail must show how the law should treat these and other distinctive cases. This Section explores several of these variations and
seeks to demonstrate that the evidentiary theory accounts well
for common moral intuitions regarding the proper scope of a
criminal prohibition.
A. A Blackmail Test
As Feinberg has observed, every blackmail proposal is a double conditional of the form "if-x then y; and if x then -y." The first
conditional is a "threat," the second an "offer"; y is the "act
(threatened)," -y the "act (offered)"; x is the "demand."98 In order
to explore further the validity and utility of the evidentiary theory, this Section proposes a test to assess whether any given
proposition that meets blackmail's formal requirements should be
deemed "blackmail" for purposes of the criminal law. The test has
four steps.
First,assume the actor simply performed the act threatened
(y) and ask whether that action is itself criminal. If the answer is
yes, then the proposition is just a threat to perform a criminal act
and is not blackmail. There is nothing puzzling about criminalizing a conditional threat to commit a crime, and we would confuse an already confusing subject by bringing such threats within
the rubric of blackmail. The proposition is usefully and conventionally labeled "extortion" or "criminal coercion." '
Second, if the act, y, is not itself criminal, ask whether it
causes or threatens legally cognizable harm. Ifit does not, then it
cannot be made criminal (or at least not on the strength of the
third criterion of criminalization). Certainly, one might be
tempted to call at least some propositions that fall out at this
stage "blackmail," and the designation could be appropriate so
long as we are speaking of moral rather than legal offenses. However, the purpose of this inquiry is to determine the proper scope
'"Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 246-47 (cited in note 2).
'"As Feinberg has explained, distinctions between such terms as "extortion" and
"blackmail" have not been consistently observed. Id at 240-42 (classifying extortion and
blackmail within the broad genus of theft). The "blackmail" label is best reserved for
threats to perform a legal act, while threats to commit an unlawful act are either "extortion" (if the threat is to be carried out in the future) or "robbery by threat" (if the threatened action is immediate). See, for example, Shavell, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1877 & n 1 (cited
in note 23) (adopting a similar nomenclature).
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of a criminal prohibition. Accordingly, when performing the act
threatened would impose a "disutility" that society would not
deem a legal harm, this step of the test concludes that the proposition is not blackmail.
If the act is not criminal yet causes harm that is cognizable
for purposes of the criminal law, the next task is to explore
whether the actor has morally bad motives. The third step, therefore, is to identify which particular reason(s) for action would
have made the actor's harm-causing conduct morally justified.
The fourth step is to ask whether the actor's offer not to perform y
on condition x makes it materially less likely that he was actually
motivated by any one of the morally justifying reasons identified
in the third step. 0" If so (and if that perceived likelihood is sufficiently low)1 the original proposition should be condemned as
20

blackmail.

As should be expected; this test supports criminalizing B's
threat to reveal A's adultery unless A pays $1,000. The first step
is to disregard the threat and offer, and to assume that B simply
disclosed A's adultery. That is not a crime. Next, ask whether
that act causes legally cognizable harm. It does. 0 2 Third, identify
the motives B must have had in order to keep his disclosure from
being morally blameworthy. Fourth, consider whether B's preceding offer to preserve A's secret upon payment of $1,000 makes
it materially less likely that B did in fact act because of the motives hypothesized at the third step. We have already answered
this question in the affirmative.0 3
Frequently, such a conclusion will be warranted when the apparent purpose of the
offer is incommensurable with the hypothetical "legitimate" purposes animating the act, y.
"We are still not in a position to specify what the threshold likelihood should be. See
note 152. The familiar standard of proof in criminal cases might suggest that conduct
should be excluded from the criminal ban unless the fourth step permits one to' conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor would have lacked morally justifying motives for
engaging in act y. This formulation would be correct were the question whether the actor
should be convicted under a statute that prohibits the commission of harm-causing conduct with morally bad motives. The standard need not be so strict, however, when the
question is whether specific definable categories of conduct should be prohibited by the
criminal law, for overbreadth in criminalizing conduct implicates different considerations
than does overbreadth in convicting individuals. So long as a criminal law gives fair notice
of proscribed conduct, and individuals are not convicted under such a statute unless they
are found to have engaged in the proscribed conduct "beyond a reasonable doubt," criminalization can be justified on a substantially lesser showing. However, because we will be
unable to progress far in articulating the proper required showing without first adopting a
particular general justifying aim of the criminal law, perhaps the best we can do at present is to tolerate this vaguely worded test and to focus not on the bottom-line likelihood
that the actor would have possessed bad motives had he engaged in the conduct threatened, but rather on the probative weight the offer lends toward that inquiry.
' See note 160 and accompanying text.
'See notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
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This brief application of the blackmail test should suggest
that the test is simply a more formalized (though not a purely
mechanistic) articulation of the evidentiary theory from Section
IE. As such, it does not demonstrate that either the test or the
theory is correct. A formal proof is, in any event, impossible. The
following Section does the next best thing: attempting to show
that the results of the evidentiary theory of blackmail and its test
conform either to existing strongly shared intuitions, or to judgments that can be accepted upon reflection.
B. Applications
This Section analyzes seven categories of conduct, both
within and without the central case of blackmail, that challenge
either the criminalization of blackmail in toto or the integrity of
any unified explanation of the crime. These seven categories are:
(1) "hard" commercial bargaining; (2) market price blackmail; (3)
threats to expose a crime; (4) threats by the victim of the person
blackmailed; (5) public interest blackmail; (6) noninformational
blackmail; and (7) bribery. The inquiry throughout is whether
this particular category of conduct is criminalizable as a matter of
principle because it satisfies the twin requirements that it ordinarily cause harm and ordinarily be undertaken with morally bad
motives. Whenever the answer is no, one must ask whether it
would be practical to carve out an exception for that category
from a general blackmail ban. Since this Article attempts only to
answer the broad theoretical questions regarding blackmail, it
does not explore the particular issues this second question raises;
doing so would amount to proposing a model blackmail statute.
1.

"Hard" bargains.

Explicitly or implicitly, every potential commercial transaction conforms to the same double conditional form as does blackmail. The proposition implicitly conveyed by your local retailer,
for example, is this: "If you pay me the listed purchase price for
any good in my store, I will give it to you; if you do not, I won't."
Aside from a formal structural similarity, this proposition does
not look much like blackmail. Things get a little murkier, however, in the case of the "hard bargain," like that presented by Jeffrie Murphy's hypothetical owner of the Babe Ruth-autographed
baseball.2 "4

See text accompanying note 77.
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The hard bargainer is a seller who opportunistically jacks up
his price when he encounters a would-be buyer with an unusually
great need or desire for the seller's good. Consider an antique
dealer possessed of a cheap and ugly vase that, despite her best
efforts, she has been unable to unload for years. One day she receives a visit from an eccentric multimillionaire who announces
that the vase is precisely what he needs to complete his collection
and cap a lifelong search. When he asks the price, the dealer answers that she will not part with it for a penny less than $10 million. The collector, not a complete fool, is flabbergasted. "But it's
not worth anywhere near that much!" he argues. "Very true," the
dealer responds. "Indeed, just before you walked in, I was considering throwing it out to make space for other merchandise. But I
know both that you want it and that you can afford my new price.
Take it or leave it."
Whatever we might think of the dealer's behavior, we could
not plausibly condemn it as criminal so long as we (rightly) refrain from imposing price controls or a ban on price discrimination in all its forms. Any satisfactory theory of blackmail must,
therefore, coherently explain why the hard bargain is not blackmail. The evidentiary theory provides just such an explanation. It
begins by considering the act threatened-in this case, to retain
ownership of the vase. Very simply, this action could not be
crminalized-no matter what an observer might infer about the
motives of the actor-because it would not satisfy the harm requirement. Plainly, the collector has no legally protected interest
in the vase; neither does the public at large (though we can
imagine systems of property law under which it would). By withholding from the collector a benefit in which he has no legal interest, the dealer cannot inflict legally cognizable harm. Because
the dealer's reasons for keeping the vase-or even for destroying
it, were that her choice-are legally immaterial, a conditional
threat to do either unless paid off cannot provide any legally relevant information. Therefore, the conditional threat should be as
legal as the unconditional performance of the act. In terms of the
evidentiary blackmail test, a "hard bargain" is not criminal
blackmail because, under the second step from Section Il.A, the
acts threatened (to keep the vase or even to destroy it) would not
inflict legal harm. °5
'It is telling that the hard bargain "fails" the blackmail test at the second step,
rather than the fourth. The hard bargainer may (at least in certain cases) act with motives
we might wish to condemn as immoral, though we do not believe her conduct should be
made criminal. Put another way, there is a reasonable sense in which our hypothetical
millionaire collector might sputter with outrage, "But that's blackmail!" even though he

1998]

2.

Taking Motives Seriously

857

Market price blackmail.

Imagine B possesses an embarrassing photograph of celebrity A, for which a supermarket tabloid will pay $1,000. Assume
no external factors would make B's agreement to sell the photo a
moral wrong (that is, for example, B obtained the photo without
committing an immoral act and has no prior duty of confidentiality to A). B approaches A with this proposition: "If you pay me
$1,000, rll give you this photograph and its negative; if you do
not, rnl sell them on the open market." Theorists are divided over
whether this proposal---"market price blackmail"-should be lawfil.2 6 This scholarly uncertainty is understandable. An evidentiary analysis reveals this to be one of the most complex riddles
within the blackmail puzzle.
At first blush, this might appear an easy case. B's sale of damaging information about A to tabloid (T) would be no less hurtful
to A than if B were to give the information to T for free. Consequently, that T would pay B for the disclosure seems irrelevant.
In both cases, B would have morally acceptable motives for disclosing to T only if she were to act for the purpose of achieving
what she (reasonably) perceives to be a greater moral good. Her
offer to refrain from disclosing the photographs to T if paid by A
suggests that her disclosure would not be so motivated. The market price proposition to A thus has the same evidentiary significance as it would in the absence of a market. Because B's offer to
A appears inconsistent with the assumption that B believes publication would serve a public interest, the conditional proposition-at market price or otherwise-reveals the moral blameworthiness necessary for making such "blackmail" criminal.
This argument is sound so long as doubt about B's motives constitutes one sufficient reason not to criminalize B's sale to T in the
absence of a blackmail offer to A. Very likely, we would attribute
public spirited motives to some such unconditional disclosuresknows that the dealer's proposition is lawful and believes that it should remain so. See
Greenbelt Cooperative PublishingAssociation, Inc v Bresler, 398 US 6, 14 (1970) (noting
that accusing a hard bargainer of blackmail was neither slander when spoken nor libel
when reported because the implication was so well understood that no one would have
thought the bargainer was being accused of a crime).
"'Compare Murphy, 63 Monist at 164-65 (cited in note 2) (proposing to decriminalize
blackmail when the putative blackmailer seeks only the going market price); Ginsburg
and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1860 (cited in note 2) (same); Feinberg, Harmless
Wrongdoing at 262-64 (cited in note 2) (deeming "[d]emands for fair compensation for considerate offers not to publish' instances of "[p]lausibly justified blackmail"), with Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1987 (cited in note 3) (opining that market price blackmail "seems
like classic blackmail" and concluding that, [g]iven the lack of agreement over the rationale for blackmail," its continued criminalization is sound).
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principally those that reveal a wrongful act by, or character flaw
of, some person in a position of public trust. In these cases, the
market price blackmailer's conditional offer of silence has real
evidentiary value. But most disclosures that might be leveraged
into market price blackmail are probably not like this. It is more
likely, I think, that the bulk of information sold "on the market"
consists of things like photos of movie star M in the nude, or the
revelation that former basketball great S is sleeping with a nineteen-year-old. And these sales are probably not motivated by the
seller's belief that other morally compelling interests outweigh
the harm caused M or S. Instead, the seller's purpose is to make
a buck-not a motivation that makes the harm-causing sale morally justifiable.
If this is so, the market price blackmail offer has little or no
evidentiary value, in which case the evidentiary theory cannot
distinguish between the threat and the act. And if the evidentiary
theory cannot distinguish market price blackmail from market
price public disclosures of information about celebrities-because
the former is no more likely than the latter to be undertaken with
bad motives-then one of two conclusions follows: either B's sale
to T should be made criminal, °7 or it should not be, but only because other considerationsfavor its legalization notwithstanding
that its criminalizationwould be justifiable under the third criterion. In fact, one strong reason for allowing B to sell embarrassing information about public figures should jump immediately to
mind: the First Amendment probably forbids government intervention in this type of information market.0 8 The likely upshot,
therefore, is (1) B should be permitted to sell T reputationally
'See Murphy, 63 Monist at 165 (cited in note 2) (discussing the market price blackmail of public figures in the context of a market created by magazines such as the National Enquirer and concluding that "[i]f one really wants to criminalize even this as
blackmail, then it does seem to me that-in consistency-one ought also to seek the prohibition of the wider market").
'There is a separate possible explanation for why we might tolerate the disclosure
notwithstanding the bad motives surmised. Insofar as public figures have elicited public
interest-thus creating the market necessary to produce a market price-by voluntarily
entering the realm of public attention, they have made their private lives, to some extent
and in some indistinct sense, public commodities. It could be argued, therefore, that by
seeking and achieving celebrity, public figures have assumed the risk of widespread invasions of their privacy. Arguably, then, any harm such invasions may cause should not be
legally cognizable. See Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at xxviii (cited in note 2) (defining
"wrongless harms"). Notably, this argument for legalizing the disclosure also favors legalizing the market price blackmail, which turns out to be just like the hard economic bargain: because it does not matter for purposes of the criminal law whether one who sells
reputationally harmful information about a celebrity to a publisher is motivated by her
view of the public interest or just by narrow pecuniary gain, any potential evidentiary
value of the market price blackmail proposition is legally irrelevant.
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harmful information about public figure A, even though (2) the
class of persons who make the unconditional sale to T are probably not less morally blameworthy than those who make a conditional offer to A.
Should any of this matter for purposes of deciding whether to
prohibit market price blackmail? Maybe. °9 Insofar as the third
criterion of criminalization serves a retributivist general justifying aim, the reasons for tolerating (presumptively) morally
blameworthy sales of harmful information to third parties are
probably irrelevant to the criminalization of market price blackmail. Even if the average market price blackmailer is no more
blameworthy (and very possibly less)21 than the average unconditional seller, all that matters is whether his conduct is ordinarily
harm-causing and morally blameworthy. As we have seen, it appears that it is. That some other harm-causing blameworthy conduct (the sale of reputationally harmful information to T) remains
legal is beside the point.
But to the extent the third criterion serves a consequentialist
justifying aim, the argument for decriminalizing market price
blackmail seems strong. After all, the market price blackmailer of
A differs from one who simply sells reputationally harmful information to T in one conspicuous respect: he gives a right of first refusal to the person most likely to be harmed by publication of the
information. This seems like a decent thing to do. Insofar as we
adopt the third criterion of criminalization in order to reinforce
desired moral norms,' we risk disserving those norms by drawing criminal lines that prominently distinguish two categories of
'Even if they do not lead us to conclude that this conduct should be decriminalized,
the foregoing assumptions might nonetheless advise against terming the conduct "blackmail." Indeed, if point (2) above is correct, the market price threat would not qualify as
blackmail under my proposed definition, which specifies that the actor's motives for engaging in the threatened act would be opaque but for the conditional offer. See text accompanying note 183. Of course, we could keep the market price threat criminal, call it
"blackmail," and revise my proposed definition. But to do so would risk undermining the
threats evidentiary significance-which is the key to unlocking the blackmail puzzle.
Consequently, if this conduct is to remain criminal, conceptual precision might be better
served by deeming it a form of extortion, and expanding that definition to include some
threats to perform acts that, although legal, could be made criminal on familiar principles.
2'One reason why so many people favor legalizing market price blackmail becomes
clear by imagining what a market price blackmail proposition might look like: "I happen
to have a photograph of you for which a tabloid is willing to pay $1,000. rm inclined to
take the money," B begins, "however, I know that if I sell it, its publication will cause you
some degree of discomfort. I have no desire to cause you harm. So rm willing to turn over
the photo to you for the same $1,000 the tabloid has offeredL" See, for example, Feinberg,
Harmless Wrongdoing at 263-64 (cited in note 2) (describing the "fair compensation"
blackmailer as "commendably benevolent," "thoughtful," "considerate," and "genero[us").
" See note 144.
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conduct but discourage and punish the seemingly less blamewor-

thy of the

two.

212

In short, then, the particular reasons for legal-

izing the unconditional sale by B to T should, on consequentialist
reasoning,
entail also legalizing the conditional sale offer by B to
3
A.

21

3.

Crime exposure blackmail.

A second special category within the central case is thought
to arise when the information B threatens to reveal would not
merely embarrass A, but would subject him to criminal penalty.
This variation, which we may inelegantly term "crime exposure
blackmail," has provoked particular attention from law and economics scholars, who query whether permitting blackmail of this
type would benefit society as a form of private law enforcement.
21 4
Their answers vary.

212

Perhaps this anomaly would not send a perverse social message were there strong

reasons for actually encouraging (rather then merely tolerating) B's sale to T. But this is
probably not the case, for the First Amendment interests implicated (in the case of public
figures who are not public officials) are more likely ones of process than outcome. That is,
the health of a free society does not depend on whether we see photos of Fergie topless; it
matters only that the government not decide whether we do.
2
'Legalizing market price blackmail need not entail legalizing "supra market price
blackmail"-the offer to sell A embarrassing information for a sum substantially in excess
of what T would pay (as in the recent Bill Cosby case). The state can regulate the price B
may charge A for nonpublication--capping it at the market price-for the same reason the
state engages in price regulation elsewhere. Price regulation is a common way of limiting
the monopolist's price to a hypothetical competitive price. And the blackmailer (market
price, supra-market price, or otherwise) must be a monopolist (or, at least, an oligopolist)
of the information he threatens to reveal, else his offer of secrecy would have little value.
However, B's possession of information about A does not make him equally a monopolist
with respect to the rest of the world as it does with respect to A himself. If B is the only
person with photographs ofA in a compromising position, he is, by definition, a monopolist
supplier. But his monopoly is economically meaningful only to the extent there are no
adequate substitutes for those photos. In the broader market of "information about public
figures," substitutes for B's photos of celebrity A usually do exist-embarrassing or scandalous information (photographs, interviews, etc.) about celebrities C, D, and E. But these
are not substitutes as far as A is concerned. Consequently, consistent with wellestablished justifications for economic regulation of monopolies, the state could reasonably
decide to protect A from monopolistic exploitation by prohibiting B from charging A more
than the hypothetical competitive price for the information in question-a price adequately approximated by the existing market price. Conceivably, the state could even enforce this rule through the criminal law on the strength of the first criterion of criminalization. See text accompanying note 142.
24 Compare, for example, Brown, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1935 (cited in note 12) (arguing
that legalizing blackmail of criminals would probably increase deterrence of other crimes),
with Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1823-27 (cited in note 2) (concluding that the effects are
ambiguous); Landes and Posner, 4 J Legal Stud at 42-44 (cited in note 39) (same); Shavell,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1899-1900 (cited in note 23) (contending that it is more efficient to
maintain a ban on crime exposure blackmail, supplemented by public authority to offer
rewards for the identification of criminals).
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Whatever uncertainty a utilitarian (or wealth maximization)
analysis might engender, it is probably obvious to most people
that crime exposure blackmail should be a crime. Indeed, under
the reductivist approach of Feinberg and Gorr, the matter is simple: because it is wrongful to withhold information about a crime,
it is equally wrongful to offer to withhold it for payment.215 Both
the offer and the unconditional performance of the act offered
may be criminalized. In fact, however, the criminal law treats the
conditional offer substantially more severely. Under the common
law, the mere failure to report information about a crime (including the identity of the perpetrator) was a misdemeanor called
misprision of felony.216 Modern statutes have tended to ignore it
entirely.2 7 In contrast, the conditional threat to report information about a crime is blackmail." 8 The evidentiary theory-based
on the insight that the blackmail proposition is important for
what it tends to reveal about the reasons this particular actor
would have for engaging in the act threatened--explains why.
The critical step is to explore why the law tolerates a failure
to expose a criminal. Plainly, silence can cause substantial harm
to the public. It hampers efforts to punish and deter crime, and it
can be a but for cause of the criminal's future crimes. Moreover,
the moral blameworthiness of remaining silent in this case also
seems apparent, at least initially, for it tends to bespeak a disregard for the common good and the concrete interests of actual and
potential victims. But a moment's reflection reveals that we
should not quickly attribute bare selfishness to the silent witness.21 9 Her silence may be motivated largely by fear of retaliation, by friendship and loyalty toward the criminal, and by fear of
the police. Our sympathy for these220motivations provides an explanation for the lenient treatment.
"See Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 243-45 (cited in note 2).
"See id at 243.
"'See P.R. Glazebrook, How Long, Then, Is The Arm Of The Law To Be?, 25 Mod L
Rev 301, 307 n 51 (1962) ("No court in the United States has been prepared to adopt the

English doctrine in its simplicity, and hold that a mere failure to disclose knowledge of a
felony is itself an offence."). However, through the offense of "compounding," the Model
Penal Code would make it a misdemeanor to accept money in consideration for failing to

report to law enforcement authorities information about the suspected commission of a
crime. MPC § 242.5.
"See, for example, MPC § 223.4(2) (defining as guilty of "theft by extortion" anyone
who "purposely obtains property of another by threatening to . . . accuse anyone of a

criminal offense").
"Here the term "witness" refers loosely to anyone who has knowledge relevant to the
discovery of a crime or the capture and conviction of the culprit, no matter the nature of
the information or the manner in which it was obtained.
'This seems to be the very sentiment underlying Chief Justice Marshall's famous
pronouncement in Marbury v Brooks, 20 US (7 Wheat) 556, 575-76 (1822): "It may be the

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:795

Consider now the threat. Had the witness threatened to expose the criminal unless paid off, we infer that her motives for
violating her civic duty had nothing to do with either love or fear
of the criminal (either of which would be a morally mitigating factor). Rather, we can infer, she was motivated by pure selfishness.
The fact of her blackmail proposal provides circumstantial evidence as to her mental state: we now believe that she was in fact
activated by more culpable motives than, absent this evidence, we
had hypothesized might have motivated her.
The evidentiary test (when applied with slight variation) reaffirms this conclusion. The variation is to reverse the roles of
threat and offer in the analysis. Assume, then, that the actor performed the act offered (-y). The mere act of remaining silent is not
a crime, or, if a crime, is a fairly trivial one (step 1). The act does,
however, cause cognizable harm to the public (step 2). The effective legalization of the act is due to a surmise that the actor is
motivated more by fear or loyalty than by selfishness (step 3).
Consideration of the threat ("I'll tell unless you pay") strongly
undermines this hypothesis. Therefore, crime exposure blackmail
should be both a crime and a more serious offense than mere
misprision of felony.
4. Victim blackmail.
Should the preceding analysis of crime exposure blackmail
change if the individual who threatens to expose A's crime was
A's victim? What if B threatens to file a criminal complaint
against A unless A provides B reasonable compensation for the
harms B actually suffered? The Model Penal Code specifies that
it should be an affirmative defense to a prosecution for threatening to "accuse anyone of a criminal offense... that the property
obtained by threat of accusation... was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to
which such accusation... relates."'21 This defense was added "in
duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offence which comes to his
knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty
is too harsh for man." The immediately preceding sentence provides revealing context for
the otherwise cryptic qualifier in every case: "The only feature in the transaction to which
blame is attached," the Court explained, "is the attempt of a father-in-law to conceal the
forgeries of a son-in-law, by paying off the notes he had forged." See also Haupt v United
States, 330 US 631, 641-42 (1947) (holding in a treason prosecution that "[iut was for the
jury to weigh the evidence that the acts proceeded from parental solicitude against the
evidence of adherence to the German cause' and that the jury could disbelieve defendant's
contention that he "merely had the misfortune to sire a traitor and all he did was to act as
an indulgent father toward a disloyal son").
"' NPC § 223.4.
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order to assure that one who had a civil complaint for damages
against another could not be convicted of extortion for threatening during negotiations to file a criminal charge"--conduct "many
regard as legitimate negotiating tactics." 2
Such a negotiating ploy would not be legitimate under an
evidentiary analysis.2" The purpose of the criminal law is not
principally compensatory. It serves retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, and rehabilitative goals that are not comparably well
served by monetary (let alone confidential) settlement between
offender and victim. Consequently, if we believe that all members
of the community have a civic duty to report crime, then it cannot
be morally acceptable for a victim to offer to ignore her obligation
for personal gain--even if that gain is in some sense compensatory. This is not to claim it makes no moral difference whether B
is A's victim (rather than a mere witness to A's crime) and is demanding arguably "reasonable" compensation (rather than an excessive "penalty"). It is only to conclude that the difference is not
such as to make B's conduct morally justified. The factors the
Model Penal Code identifies can properly be considered mitigating; they should not constitute an affirmative defense.
In contrast to the criminal law, victim compensation is the
chief purpose of tort law. The evidentiary test reinforces the intuition that B may threaten to sue A unless A compensates B for
the injuries and losses that A has caused to B. Assume B files
suit against A. This action is moral and lawful on the presumption (step 3) that B is motivated by a good faith belief that he has
a legally enforceable claim for damages against A. Now consider
the fact that B had offered not to sue ifA paid B's damages. This
evidence is consistent with the motivation we previously ascribed
to B: either way, B's (morally acceptable) objective is to be made
whole.

Id at comment (f).
'The ethical rules gvening attorney conduct likewise reveal such action to be of
questionable legitimacy. The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary
Rules provides that "(a] lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct DR 7-105A (ABA 1982). The
1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct lack any such specific proscription. Instead,
they generically bar criminal conduct "that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b) (ABA 1983). As a result, threatening to file a criminal complaint would
constitute an ethical violation only in jurisdictions where it would violate the criminal law.
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Public interest blackmail.

The typical blackmailer demands from his victim a cash
payment to which he has no legitimate claim. But the blackmailer need not demand money. Nor need he even seek private
advantage (narrowly defined). A recurring question, accordingly,
is whether blackmail should be criminalized when the blackmailer's ostensible objective is a public, rather than private, good.
Under the evidentiary approach, the answer is clear: it depends.
We can solve the puzzle of "public interest blackmail" by examining what is presumed to be one of the most common blackmail threats, "homosexual blackmail."' 4 Assume B threatens to
expose A's homosexuality (or homosexual acts) unless A pays B
$1,000. This is an unproblematic case of criminal blackmail. And
quick application of the evidentiary test explains why. The key
(step 3) is to identify the morally justifying reasons B might have
for exposing A. Different observers will have widely differing intuitions regarding which reasons do in fact supply moral justification for outing A. Most persons, I suspect, would recognize few
if any motives as morally legitimate beyond protecting a benighted spouse or suitor. Others might endorse a more general
interest in exposing homosexuals, perhaps as a means to discourage homosexual activity.225 B's conditional offer of silence (step 4)
should have evidentiary significance to individuals who fall near
either pole, however. B's willingness to remain silent for personal
gain suggests that his motives for exposing A would satisfy neither the social liberal nor the cultural conservative.
The public interest variant on homosexual blackmail arises
when B threatens to out A unless A takes some specified action
favorable to homosexual interests. Imagine that a gay rights organization threatens to out a closeted gay Congressman unless he
abandons his support for anti-gay legislation.22 Under an eviden-

For evidence regarding the possibly great frequency of such threats, see Posner, 141
U Pa L Rev at 1843 n 47 (cited in note 2).
'Some people might conclude that outing is categorically unjustifiable. This view
does not, however, undermine the evidentiary theory. One who believes there are no morally acceptable reasons for exposing an individual's homosexuality should, I submit, favor
making outing illegal (on the second or third criteria of criminalization). They can then
approve criminalizing homosexual blackmail on the grounds that it is (or should be) simple extortion.
WIn the summer of 1996, the Advocate, a gay-oriented national magazine, threatened
to out Arizona Congressman James Kolbe because of his support for the Defense of Marriage Act, which provides that states need not recognize same-sex marriages performed in
another state. Kolbe preempted the Advocate by announcing his homosexuality in advance
of the magazine. See John E. Yang, Rep. Kolbe Announces He Is Gay, Wash Post A8 (Aug
3, 1996).
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tiary analysis, this proposal should be legal because the threat
provides little support for an inference that, were the threateners
to expose the legislator, they would do so with blameworthy motives. Again, the third and fourth steps of the evidentiary test explain this conclusion. Were the gay rights activists to out the
Congressman, their likely motivation would be to expose the latter as a (probable) hypocrite and political opportunist." The activists' offer to keep the legislator's homosexuality secret if he
supports gay political interests is potentially consistent with this
hypothesis: the activists' (arguably) morally acceptable reason for
outing the legislator disappears if the basis upon which voters
might suspect the legislator of hypocrisy is eliminated. This does
not mean, however, that all blackmail putatively in the public interest should be permissible. If members of Greenpeace were to
threaten to out the same closeted Congressman unless he were to
vote against NAFTA, then the blackmailers' belief that they are
furthering the public interest should be legally irrelevant. The
particular content of their offer tends to discredit, rather than
confirm, the supposition that they harbor morally acceptable motives for exposing the politician's homosexuality.
This discussion reveals that Feinberg is only half right in
admonishing that a coherent blackmail theory must survey "the
various types of threats in addition to threats to reveal information; ... the various types of demands in addition to demands for

money or property; and.., the various types of means employed
in addition to single-shot random opportunism,
Threats, demands, and means all matter. But they must not be assessed in
isolation. The lesson of public interest blackmail is that a threatener should not be entitled to escape a criminal prohibition on
blackmail just because he seeks to achieve what he might reasonably believe is a public interest, rather than his own (narrow)
self-interest. This is appropriate: a modern-day Robin Hood
would have no defense to charges of burglary or robbery, and few
would criticize this result. Where the act threatened, y, and the
condition demanded, x, would serve the same public interest,
'This was precisely the rationale espoused by the Advocate in the Kolbe case. See id.
This is not to say the suspicion is correct. A homosexual politician can oppose a piece of
(ostensibly) gay-friendly legislation without being hypocritical, just as an AfricanAmerican politician can with integrity oppose legislation considered to benefit AfricanAmericans as a whole or a Jewish politician can oppose policies favorable to Israel. Indeed,
Barney Frank, an openly gay Congressman from Massachusetts, declared that he approves of outing "in cases of gross hypocrisy," but did not think Kolbe's was such a case.
See Kolbe Won't Be Gay Rights "PosterBoy", Worcester Telegram & Gaz A10 (Aug 4,
1996).
'Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoingat 258 (cited in note 2).
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however, the conditional proposition would properly be excepted
from a blackmail ban.
6.

Noninformational blackmail.

Blackmail does not invariably involve a threat to disclose information. While cases of noninformational blackmail may be unusual, they are not difficult to imagine. Professor Leo Katz has
composed a variety of examples:
"Pay me $10,000, or I will seduce your fianc6"; "Pay me
$10,000, or I will persuade your son that it is his patriotic
duty to volunteer for combat in Vietnam"; "Pay me $10,000,
or I will give your high-spirited, risk-addicted 19-year-old
daughter a motorcycle for Christmas"; "Pay me $10,000, or I
will hasten
our ailing father's death by leaving the Catholic
Church. 22
As the evidentiary theory explains, all of these threats are clear
cases of criminal blackmail.
The acts threatened in noninformational blackmail, as in all
blackmail, are perfectly legal. But they also cause (or risk) cognizable harm. Indeed, three of the four examples above involve imposing substantial risk of death upon another. Nonetheless, the
acts themselves are tolerated, perhaps encouraged, because we
assume that the people who commit them have good reasons to
risk harm. The ordinary assumption, for example, is that when B
encourages A to enlist, she does so because she believes that it is
A's duty or that A will profit from the experience. Here, as elsewhere, the conditional threat has evidentiary significance: B's offer not to encourage A to enlist if B receives a suitable boon seems
inconsistent with our initial assumption. The offer reveals B's
willingness to risk A's death, and not for good motives. Hence, the
threat should be made criminal.
While the evidentiary theory supports Katz's view that
blackmail need not be a crime of information,"' Katz's examples
Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1567-68 (cited in note 92).
'Not everything that looks like noninformational blackmail should be treated as
such. Nozick, among others, has drawn attention to a deceptively tricky case: B's threat to
build a structure on his land that will block the view of his neighbor A, unless A pays B
$1,000. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 84-85 (cited in note 2). Consistent with the
evidentiary theory, B's proposal should be criminal (assuming, counterfactually, that
blocking A's view is a legally cognizable harm) only if the offer has substantial probative
weight toward demonstrating that B would have no actual, legitimate interest in building

the structure. But does it? Is it not just as likely that B values the structure, but at somewhat less than $1,000? And why are such structures often called "spite fences" (at least
when they are, indeed, fences)? Doesn't this nomenclature suggest that, in this category of
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likewise support the claim of the evidentiary theory that the
threat has evidentiary value only. Imagine this variation on
Katz's last hypothetical: B leaves the Catholic Church; B's father
dies; B returns to the Catholic Church. Add a few more facts-a
long history of animosity between B and her father, or a substantial inheritance-and the inference that B left the Church precisely in order to hasten her father's death is easy to make. If so,
B's actions might suddenly look like a rare (but potentially effective) method of homicide-murder by religious conversion. At the
same time, the blackmail threat would no longer look like a morally aggravating factor. 1
7.

Bribery.

A final puzzle is what Professor Sidney DeLong calls the second paradox of blackmail: why is a conditional offer that would be
illegal if proposed by the blackmailer legal if initiated by the victim? 2 DeLong locates the moral difference between blackmail
and "bribery" (a proposal initiated by a potential blackmail victim) in the social meaning of the narratives paradigmatic of the
respective transactions. "[T]he purpose of the law of blackmail,"
DeLong proposes in a vein similar to Fletcher's, "is to protect the
community against the conspiratorial agreement of blackmailer
and victim, which isolates and subjects him to a submissive relationship with the blackmailer." In contrast, "[t]hrough bribery,
the victim transforms the menace into an ally whose cooperation
preserves the victim's place in the larger community."'
No doubt this explanation touches on one distinction between
blackmail and bribery. But it does not cut as forcefully as DeLong
suggests. After all, the briber risks highlighting his vulnerability
to disclosure, thereby increasing the risk that the recipient of his
bribe will return for more-next time as a blackmailer. In any
event, the "puzzle" DeLong seeks to solve is not very puzzling.
Bribery is legal because, ordinarily, there is not the slightest basis for criminalizing it.

cases, the probability that B would make a conditional offer if acting from bad motives is
actually less than if acting from good motives-thereby denying the evidentiary inference?
See note 179 and text accompanying note 175.
"'This conclusion should not sound bizarre. Recall the robber who says, "Your money
or your life" to induce his victim to hand over her money, and compare him to the man
who approaches a stranger on the street, pulls a gun, declares, "Your life," and shoots him
dead. The robber can only be convicted of robbery, the murderer of murder.
'"DeLong, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1663 (cited in note 11).
mId at 1691.
mId at 1692.
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When the act the briber solicits is itself clearly wrongful,
there is nothing perplexing about making the bribe illegal and
punishing both the giver and the receiver-hence the common
law crimes of "bribery" (offering a government official payment
for favorable treatment) and "extortion under color of public office" (solicitation or acceptance by a public official of payment). 5
Similarly, the Model Penal Code makes it separately criminal
both to offer to pay a witness to a crime to remain silent and for
the witness to accept such a payment. 6 Accordingly, the supposed puzzle of bribery arises only when the moral character of
the act the briber solicits is indeterminate-as when A offers B
$1,000 for B's promise not to tell A's wife about A's extramarital
affair, or not to give a motorcycle to A's risk-addicted daughter.
In these cases, the so-called bribe is legal, and should remain
so, because it satisfies neither fundamental prerequisite for
crmiinalization (under the third criterion, at least). It inflicts no
legally cognizable harm, and it reveals no morally blamewoithy
motives. The briber's motivation in each case is quite apparent,
and is no different from that of the driver who parks his car in a
rough neighborhood and offers to pay some guys loitering nearby
to "keep an eye on it." Blackmail is criminal, according to the evidentiary theory, because the blackmailer threatens an act that,
were he to engage in it, would be blameworthy, harm-causing
conduct. Bribery, on the other hand, is lawful because the briber
seeks to stave off potential harm (to himself or to someone else)
and because he may well have morally acceptable motives.
All that seems straightforward. The more difficult question is
whether it should be criminal to accept the bribe. If the nominal
bribe really is just a payoff by a blackmail victim to a blackmailer
savvy enough to convey his threat by innuendo, there is no reason
why the law must respect the formal structure of the transaction;
so long as a factfinder concludes that the nominal bribe taker intended to communicate a blackmail threat, it is reasonable to
treat him as a blackmailer and to punish him accordingly.
But what if the idea of the bribe really did originate with the
maker? Here, the evidentiary analysis requires us to examine two
questions: (1) does the bribe taker cause legally cognizable harm?
and (2) if so, does he have morally blameworthy motives? Receipt
of bribes (outside of the special cases noted above) is, and should

' See James IUndgren, The Theory, History, and Practiceof the Bribery-ExtortionDistinction, 141 U Pa L Rev 1695, 1698-1700 (1993). See also MPC § 240.1.
'See MPC §§ 242.3, 242.5.
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remain, lawful on an evidentiary approach because the answer to
both questions is (ordinarily) no.
Consider an earlier example: B accepts A's offer of $1,000 in
exchange for a promise not to tell A's wife of his infidelity. Disregarding the payment, and ignoring causation complications suggested by the act/omission distinction, we might agree that B
"causes" A's wife to (continue to) be deceived as to her husband's
faithfulness. This is probably not legally cognizable harm. Even if
it were, we would be compelled to examine B's motives. Why
might B refrain from speaking out? Morally blameworthy motives
are imaginable-perhaps B takes pleasure in the knowledge that
A's wife has been made an object of ridicule in the communitybut seem unlikely. Most probably, B acts out of a habitual disinclination "to get involved." If pressed to explain himself, though, he
would probably first invoke a general presumption that one
should not undertake to "do good" unless one can be reasonably
confident that one's intervention will produce more good than
harm, then observe that he remains ignorant of too many potentially relevant factors to justify intermeddling. He might wonder,
"Isn't it possible that unmasking A as an adulterer would serve
principally to cause A's wife substantial and unnecessary mental
anguish?" This seems a wholly moral motivation for B's inaction:
first, do no harm.
Not much changes once we consider B's acceptance of the
payoff from A. It is still likely that B believes intermeddling is
unjustified. He might also believe that A is a cad (or worse). B's
willingness to profit at A's expense does not make it substantially
less likely that B would have remained silent even absent a payment, and that in either case (paid or not paid) his silence is principally animated by a concern that he not cause harm. One might
propose, though, that B is now causing harm to A (rather than A's
wife), and that he does so with morally blameworthy motives. But
it is hard to see how B, by accepting a payment A voluntarily
made, is causing A a "harm" with which the law should be concerned. 7 In short, one who refrains from the type of action a
bribe maker might wish to forestall is not likely enough to have
(in)acted with morally blameworthy motives as to justify criminal
punishment in accord with the third criterion. This is true
'It is fair to call A's payment "voluntary" in these circumstances. True, A would
rather B did not know about his affair (in which case there would be no reason at all for
him to pay B), but this fact alone cannot suffice to make A's offer "involuntary" without
making the concept of "voluntary" action all but meaningless. Recall that if A's offer is in
response to B's hinted threat of disclosure, A's offer is not voluntary, and B is properly
treated as a blackmailer.
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whether or not B has been offered, and has accepted, payment for
forbearanceY
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Blackmail is a serious crime. Moreover, it exerts a grasp on
the popular imagination almost surely out of proportion to its
frequency. For these reasons alone, seeking to explain and justify
its criminalization would be a worthwhile endeavor. But there is
more, for those bitten by the blackmail bug have long suspected
that a solution to the blackmail puzzle would help to resolve
other puzzles both within and beyond the criminal law. 9 This
Section explores that suspicion by offering a few preliminary
thoughts regarding the evidentiary theory's possible implications.
A. Motive and Mens Rea in the Criminal Law
At first blush, the evidentiary theory might seem to suggest
an answer to arguably the most profound and persistent problem
plaguing criminal theory-the "true" meaning of mens rea. Although Professor Francis Sayre concluded in his pathbreaking
'This is a general claim. There may be contexts in which the bribe taker's inaction
does cause legally cognizable harm and in which the fact of the bribe provides sufficiently
strong circumstantial evidence that the bribe taker's motives for inaction are morally
blameworthy in order to justify criminalization. For example: A harms C by publishing a
defamatory falsehood. B is in possession of information that disproves the defamatory utterance. It is plausible that B's failure to disclose that information "causes" C legally cognizable harm. Nonetheless, uncertainty about B's reasons for remaining silent might be
great enough to counsel against makingB's silence criminal. Naturally, B's silence would
be morally justifiable were he ignorant of the fact of the defamation, or of the exonerating
character of the information in his own possession. B's fear of retaliation by A might also
make it morally excusable for B to remain mute. All of these hypotheses, however, are
strongly undermined by the fact of B's acceptance of a payoff to remain silent. Here, B's
bribe taking does suggest selfish motives for engaging in knowing harm-causing conduct.
Consistent with the evidentiary analysis, then, this particular type of bribe taking-the
proverbial exception that proves the rule--could be made criminal.
In the (admittedly partisan) estimation of Katz and Lindgren, "one cannot think
about coercion, contracts, consent, robbery, rape, unconstitutional conditions, nuclear deterrence, assumption of risk, the greater-includes-the-lesser arguments, plea bargains,
settlements, sexual harassment, insider trading, bribery, domination, secrecy, privacy,
law enforcement, utilitarianism and deontology without being tripped up repeatedly by
the paradox of blackmail." Leo Katz and James Lindgren, Instead of a Preface, 141 U Pa L
Rev 1565, 1565 (1993).
'See generally Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observationson the Role
of Motive in the CriminalLaw Pastand Present, 1993 Utah L Rev 635. See also id at 637
& n 5 (claiming that "few conceptual pursuits in any area of the law have proven so beguiling as the attempt to give an accurate account of the so-called mental element required for criminal liability"); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv L Rev 974, 974
(1932) ("No problem of criminal law is of more fimdamental importance or has proved
more baffling through the centuries than the determination of the precise mental element
or mens rea necessary for crime.").
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early study that the term embraced a wide multiplicity of meanings,' it has become common, at least since the American Law
Institute completed its Model Penal Code over a generation ago,
to distinguish between two fundamentally different conceptions.
As Professor Martin Gardner succinctly put it in his exhaustive
recent study:
The first and historically original concept embodied an explicitly normative requirement that the offender not only intentionally commit a criminal act, but also do so out of evil
motivation. The second and currently more predominant
tradition adopts an essentially nonnormative approach that
finds sufficient ground for liability in the presence of particular states of mind without evaluating or even appealing
to the motives underlying the offender's actions.242
Plainly, the classical conception of mens rea-which Sayre
equates with "little more than a general immorality of motive" 3-- closely approximates, or even mirrors, the notion of
moral blameworthiness that underpins the evidentiary theory.
Accordingly, insofar as the evidentiary theory's utility in solving
the blackmail puzzle amounts to a powerful pragmatic vote in
support of my third criterion of criminalization, it might weigh
equally heavily in favor of the classical understanding of mens
rea. This would be of more than theoretical interest. It is a commonplace assertion that there can be no crime absent the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea.2 If mens rea "really" requires
moral blameworthiness, tangible consequences must follow-such

" See Sayre, 45 Harv L Rev at 1026 (cited in note 240) (concluding that "[tihe old conception of mens rea must be discarded, and in its place must be substituted the new conception ofmentes reae").
"2Gardner, 1993 Utah L Rev at 640 (cited in note 240).
'Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the CriminalLaw, in
Roscoe Pound, ed, HarvardLegal Essays 399, 411-12 (Harvard 1934). See also United
States v Thomas, 459 F2d 1172, 1176-77 (DC Cir 1972) (discussing the necessity of a requirement "beyond a mere intentional... act, one involving evil intent or a bad purpose"
in jury instructions); Mullen v United States, 263 F2d 275, 276 (DC Cir 1959) (defining
mens rea as "evil state of mind"); Sayre, 45 Harv L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 240) (observing that as late as the mid-nineteenth century, "the conception of mens rea was based
largely on moral blameworthiness"). For an argument that Sayre overstates the significance of motive in the early conceptions, see Hall, General Principles at 138-49 (cited in
note 150).
'Consider the oft-quoted maxim frequently traced to Coke, actus non facit reur, nisi
mens sit rea. See Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England
*107 (1641). The translation is "an act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the
mind be guilty; that is, unless the intention be criminal." Black's Law Dictionary 36 (West
6th ed 1990).
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as abolition of strict liability crimes and recognition of an ignorance of law defense for all mala prohibita crimes.245
On reflection, though, it is doubtful whether the evidentiary
theory alone has anything of importance to say about mens rea.
The evidentiary theory appears to demonstrate that the fact that
particular conduct ordinarily causes harm and reflects moral
blameworthiness constitutes a prima facie justification for criminalization. However, it does not demonstrate that the coincidence
of these conditions is necessary for particular conduct to be crnminalized. More likely, all three criteria are valid bases for criminalization. Moreover, even when criminalization of conduct is justified on the strength of the third criterion alone, moral blameworthiness is still not necessarily required to justify imposing
punishment in a given case. To be sure, if the third criterion rests
on a retributivist general justifying aim, then no individual
should be punished unless he is morally blameworthy for his offense. As H.L.A. Hart noted, retributivism in general justifying
aim entails retributivism in distribution. 6 But it is not certain
that the third criterion does rest on a retributivist foundation.
While a retributivist justifying aim would almost certainly yield
the third criterion or something very much like it, so might a consequentialist justifying aim.' And if criminalizing (ordinarily)
blameworthy, harm-causing conduct is justified on consequentialist grounds, then the propriety of punishing one who violates
the resulting criminal prohibition but is not morally blameworthy
himself must remain an open question, dependent more upon
contestable empirical assumptions than on logical deduction.
It seems, in short, that caution is warranted when assessing
the significance of the evidentiary theory for criminal law in general. The instant solution to the blackmail puzzle (if correct)
might entail the classical conception of mens rea, but it might
not.
This is not the end of the matter, however, for at least one
implication of the evidentiary theory is clear. Contrary to the familiar contention that "motive is immaterial in the substantive
criminal law,"' motive has substantial relevance. First, as the
equally familiar objection to this contention observes, the motives
of an individual defendant can prove critical for the satisfaction of

2

For a thoughtful discussion of the implications of the classical conception, see H.L-A
Hart, 23 Law & Contemp Prob at 412-27 (cited in note 142).
' H.L.4. Hart, Punishmentand Responsibility at 9 (cited in note 134). See note 142.
' 2See note 144.
'Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., CriminalLaw 227 (West 2d ed 1986).
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various affirmative defenses or for purposes of sentencing.24 9

Moreover, as the evidentiary theory reveals, the criminal law
does seem to care-at least sometimes-about the motives of the
class of potential defendants as a whole. Previous efforts to resolve the blackmail puzzle reflect one or the other of the customarily competing justifications for the state to criminalize conduct-that the conduct reduce utility (or its rough proxy, wealth),
or that it be inherently wrongful. The conspicuous lesson of the
evidentiary theory is to focus not on consequences, nor on acts,
but on actors (at least at the stage of offense definition, if not necessarily when assessing liability). If criminal law theorists take
this simple lesson seriously, I believe, the instant proposed solution to the blackmail puzzle will indeed facilitate a deeper understanding of the criminal law and might resolve a variety of
seemingly intractable puzzles.
B. Governmental Motives: Understanding Unconstitutional
Conditions
One concrete example of the evidentiary theory's potential
relevance, outside the criminal law, is provided by the so-called
unconstitutional conditions doctrine-that is, the question of
when it should be unconstitutional for a government to condition
a benefit it is not compelled to provide on the recipient relinquishing a constitutional right. Although governments attempt
this maneuver frequently and in many contexts, courts have yet
to provide clear rules for when the principle that a state may not
do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly should
trump the principle that the greater power (to withhold the benefit entirely) includes the lesser power (to grant it on condition).
Enormous scholarly commentary on the subject has not clarified
matters." While scholars widely agree that the conditional ten'The traditional view regarding motive is challenged in Douglas N. Husak, Motive
and Criminal Liability, 8 Crim Just Ethics 3 (Winter/Spring 1989) (noting the familiar
qualifications regarding the role of motive in sentencing decisions and the significance of
specific intent crimes, and arguing that an actor's motives are also central to the criminal
law's treatment of euthanasia, justification, and some excuses). Although a valuable contribution in its own right, Husak's essay is better read to initiate a debate than to offer a
well-developed competing vision of the role of motive in the criminal law. Unfortunately,
Husak's conclusion that "much important work... remains to be done" respecting "the
significance of motives to criminal liability," id at 12, is as apt now as it was nearly a decade ago.
'Among the most illuminating contributions are Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev 1413
(cited in note 130); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293
(1984); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
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der of governmental benefits should sometimes be held legitimate
and sometimes unconstitutional, there is almost universal disagreement over where and why to draw the line.
The evidentiary theory of blackmail suggests an obvious answer: motive matters. Although it is sometimes said that the motives behind state action are constitutionally irrelevant,"51 that is
a demonstrable misstatement of existing constitutional doctrine. 52 In several disparate areas of the law, a "bad" governmental motive will prove per se fatal to state action." 3 In various
other contexts, a bad motive will provoke strict scrutiny.'
When a constitutional violation (or level of scrutiny) turns on
governmental motive, the plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving that it was illegitimate. In theory, this difficult task can be
accomplished in several ways." Assume, for example, a nontenured public school teacher is fired, and that the teacher suspects
tionalLaw, 81 Harv L Rev 1439 (1968); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
ConstitutionalRights, 35 Colum L Rev 321 (1935).
" See, for example, United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 383-84 (1968); Alexander M.
Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 208 (Yale
1962).
'For a recent thoughtful rumination on the relevance of motive in public and private
contexts, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public:Some Notes
Inspiredby the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 S Ct Rev 1. The classic
arguments regarding the proper significance, for constitutional law, of state actors' motivations are Paul Brest, Palmer v Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislativeMotive, 1971 S Ct Rev 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 Yale L J 1205 (1970).
Z'For example, governmental action motivated to disadvantage a protected class will
violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v
Feeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979). Action motivated to advance religion violates the Establishment Clause. See Stone v Graham,449 US 39, 40-41 (1980). Similarly, action by any of
the several states runs afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause if undertaken for protectionist purposes. See Baldwin v GAF Seelig, Inc, 294 US 511, 522 (1935). And civil incarceration animated by a punitive purpose might violate constitutional protections against
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. See Kansas v Hendricks, 117 S Ct 2072, 2090
(1997) (Breyer dissenting) (noting that although the majority found that Kansas's civil
commitment law was not punitive, "[t]he majority agrees that the [Ex Post Facto] Clause
'forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated"),
quoting CaliforniaDeptartmentof Correctionsv Morales, 514 US 499, 505 (1995).
'Under rapidly changing voting rights jurisprudence, for example, the courts apply
strict scrutiny to redistricting decisions when the linedrawers appear to have "subordinated" other, legitimate districting principles to race. See Bush v Vera, 116 S Ct 1941,
1951 (1996). See also id at 1972-73 (Thomas concurring) (arguing that strict scrutiny
should apply whenever redistricters consider race). Likewise, under ordinary First
Amendment doctrine, facially neutral laws are subjected to strict scrutiny if adopted for
the purpose of favoring or disfavoring speech of a particular content. See Turner Broadcasting System v FCC,512 US 622, 641-42, 645-46 (1994); Harry T. Edwards and Mitchell
N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw U L Rev 1487, 1512-13 (1995) (discussing this aspect of Turner).
'See Village of Arlington Heights v Metro Housing Development Corp, 429 US 252,
265-68 (1977).
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she was terminated because of the school board's hostility to her
communist sympathies. It is well settled both that her termination would violate the First Amendment if it were so motivated
and that the burden rests on the teacher to establish that motivation." The teacher could satisfy her burden (thus shifting to the
school the burden to demonstrate that it would have fired the
teacher notwithstanding her political leanings) in numerous
ways. She could hope to rely on statistical evidence of firings by
the school board of other communist teachers that shows a dramatic correlation between a teacher's politics and her job history.
Or she could introduce minutes from a school board meeting in
which board members expressed hostility to her because of her
political views. Alternatively or additionally, she could testify
that her school principal offered to renew her contract, but only if
she resigned her position on the board of the American Communist Party. This example suggests that a governmental condition
is just another piece of circumstantial evidence that might help
establish motive in a given case.
Accordingly, an evidentiary analysis might resolve the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as follows: if and only if the
particular condition ("resign from position in communist organization") appears sufficiently inconsistent with any of the permissible reasons the state might have for withholding the benefit at
issue (that the teacher's job performance was unsatisfactory, or
that the school was eliminating the teacher's position for budgetary or curricular reasons), then the fact of the offer supports a
presumption that the state's (but-for) motive for withholding the
gratuitous benefit was improper," in which event the court is required either to hold the state action invalid per se or to subject it
to the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny. Indeed, this solution closely approximates that advanced over sixty years ago by
'See, for example, Mt. Healthy City School Districtv Doyle, 429 US 274, 287 (1977);
Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 598 (1972).
'As in the blackmail context, the inference is not ironclad. In the termination case,
the state could argue that it terminated the teacher solely because of her poor job performance. It could then try to explain away the conditional offer of continued employment
by arguing, say, that the teacher was ill-prepared for class and chronically overtired, that
the school board suspected these problems were due to the fact that she devoted many
hours each day to her officership in the Communist party, and that, because she showed
promise as a teacher, the board was willing to give her a second chance if they could have
adequate confidence that she would devote sufficient time to her teaching duties. Of
course, a comparable argument intended to rebut the inference of bad motive is not open
to the ordinary defendant in a blackmail prosecution. Whether it should be available to
the government in an unconstitutional conditions case depends upon whether the inquiry
into motives is made ex post and particularistic or (as in the blackmail situation) ex ante
and categorical-a question beyond the scope of the present discussion.
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Professor Robert Hale.'
Unfortunately, though, subsequent
commentators have either overlooked or misunderstood Hale's
analysis. 9 The evidentiary theory suggests that attention to
Hale's thesis might prove profitable if we can articulate more
precisely than Hale did how the notions of "germaneness" and
"impermissible motive" can do real work. Because the governmental proposal involved in cases in which the doctrine might
apply shares the double conditional form of all blackmail propositions (if x then -y; if -x then y), the evidentiary test will be of
promising utility in resolving the mystery of unconstitutional
conditions.
CONCLUSION

It is a safe bet that blackmails criminalization does not appear puzzling to the casual observer. Not only does it resemble
' Hale begins by insisting that "there is no logical incongruity in holding that the validity of a state's exercise of power may depend upon the purpose for which it is exerted;
that a power which is valid when exerted for most purposes may be invalid when exerted
for others.' Hale, 35 Colum L Rev at 322 (cited in note 250). After examining a host of unconstitutional conditions cases, he opines that, when "determining the validity of a conditional burden,' the Supreme Court would likely be influenced 'by its views as to whether
or not the condition is germane to the purpose for which the government might normally
impose the burden, without conditions." Id at 352.
'The most thorough critique of Hale's argument comes from Sullivan. Her analysis
proceeds in three steps. First, she demonstrates persuasively that heightened scrutiny is
not invariably appropriate whenever government attaches a condition to a gratuitous
benefit that is not germane to the legitimate purposes the government might have for
withholding the benefit categorically and unconditionally. See Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at
1461 n 196 (cited in note 130). Second, she asserts that because germaneness per se is not
dispositive, "[slome theory of appropriate legislative process would seem necessary to explain' attention to the "germaneness" of governmental conditions. Id at 1468. Third, she
canvasses the three principal contending theories of legislative process-interest group
pluralism, civic republicanism, and public choice-en route to arguing that each either
fails to explain any concern with germaneness of conditions and benefits or reflects too
tenuous a relationship to unconstitutional conditions problems to be useful. Id at 1468-76.
The upshot is that "germaneness theories fail to resolve unconstitutional conditions problems." Id at 1476.
Sullivan's analysis suffers from two defects. First, it rests on an ungenerous reading of
Hale. Although Hale could no doubt have been clearer, he is better understood, I think, to
recognize that it is illegitimacy of governmental purpose, not nongermaneness between
condition and benefit per se, that raises constitutional problems. Lack of germaneness is
significant only insofar as it often allows courts to infer that the legislature was motivated
by illegitimate purposes. Second, even if this were not Hale's view, it is one that deserved
consideration. As noted above, see notes 250-59 and accompanying text, existing constitutional doctrine identifies some governmental motives as substantively illegitimate (absolutely or presumptively) without itself resting upon any particular model of normative
governmental process. Sullivan's critique of Hale is infirm because it never gives adequate
attention to the theory that some governmental motives are simply illegitimate (no matter
the legislative process that effectuates them), and that nongermane conditions are useful-though not dispositive-tools for identifying when such improper motives were at
work.
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other varieties of theft, the criminalization of which rarely raises
eyebrows, but blackmail just smells likes a nasty practice. Theorists from a wide range of disciplines, however, have long identified a puzzle-that it is illegal to threaten what it is legal to doand have worked vigorously to propose solutions.
Those solutions have been of two broad types. Some scholars,
including many of a law and economics bent, have proposed that
toleration of blackmail would produce a variety of adverse social
consequences not arising in a regime that permits the acts a
blackmailer threatens. Other writers, more deontologically inclined, have argued that the blackmail threat is inherently
wrongful in a way that the acts threatened are not. But all extant
theories suffer from serious failings. Blackmail does not always
produce the consequences that the first set of theorists allege,
and claims about the moral difference between blackmail threats
and the acts threatened prove unconvincing.
This Article has originated from a wholly different perspective. Whereas prior theories have proceeded on the express
premise, or implicit assumption, that criminalizing particular
conduct is justified on one of two competing grounds-either that
it yields net adverse social consequences or that it is wrong in itself-this Article has supposed that criminalization of conduct is
prima facie justified when it is likely to cause harm and to be undertaken by a morally blameworthy actor. This simple proposition, which might rest on either consequentialist or retributivist
conceptions (or both) of the general justifying aim of the institution of criminal punishment, explains why blackmail is criminal
even though the acts a blackmailer threatens are not. It is probable that one who simply undertakes an act of the sort a blackmailer might threaten lacks morally bad motives. Therefore, the
unconditional act should not be criminal. But more evidence
might warrant a different conclusion. In particular, it is probable
that one who undertakes the same act, but only after offering to
forego the act if paid, acts with bad motives. The threat has evidentiary significance: if the actor had good motives for engaging
in the act, he likely would not have offered his abstention. If this
inference is sound (and its strength will vary depending upon the
totality of circumstances), then this particular act could be made
criminal as harm-causing, morally blameworthy conduct. And
blackmail-the threat to commit a harm-causing, morally
blameworthy act--could be criminalized too.
The two fundamental bases of the evidentiary theory, then,
are these: (1) motives matter, and (2) conditional threats can offer
powerful (albeit not conclusive) circumstantial evidence of im-
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permissible motive. By employing these two principles, this Article has attempted to resolve one stubborn puzzle of the law. That
is, it has sought to explain and to justify the criminalization of
"core" cases of blackmail, as well as to suggest a reconsideration
of the contours of the crime. Finally, it also has provided some
reason for hope that the principles underlying the evidentiary
theory might (whether singly or in tandem) have broad explanatory reach both within and without the criminal law.

